

2022-2026

Federal Ministry of Environment



FOREWORD

I am delighted to present the National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan 2022-2026 as put together by the National Biosafety Management Agency (NBMA) under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Environment in collaboration with relevant stakeholders. The policy outlines the strategic vision and goal that has been identified to help Nigeria realize her full potential and better fulfil her mission to serve her people through ensuring protection and safety against all forms of biological threats.

The process of formulating a National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan has given the nation the opportunity to take stock of her strengths, weaknesses and potentials in the light of challenges, and to put forward strategies for the development not only in response to changing needs but also as an active and participatory agent to drive scientific, social and economic changes.
The strategic themes using the 'One Health' global approach to biosecurity attest to Nigeria's commitment to achieving excellence in biosecurity through collaborative efforts of stakeholders in the dissemination and exchange of knowledge. In order to implement these strategic themes, there is need for an enabling environment in which our human, economic and physical resources are appropriately allocated and developed to help attain sustainable excellence in prevention, detection and response to biological threats [pest and disease outbreaks] however they may occur.

We have an opportunity to demonstrate our expertise, be at the forefront to tackle biosecurity challenges and ensure a bio-secured Nigeria. I am sure with our collaboration with domestic and international development partners, relevant biosecurity stakeholders, our trained human resources, the goals we aspire to accomplish will in time translate into milestones of which we can be proud of as a

Nation.

Sharon Ikeazor Hon Minister of State for Environment Federal Ministry of Environment



FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



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List of Stakeholders

- 1. African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR)
- African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa's Development (AUDA-NEPAD)
- 3. Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN)
- 4. All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN)
- 5. Biotechnology Society of Nigeria (BSN)
- 6. Broadcasting Organization of Nigeria (BON)
- 7. Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP)
- 8. Centre for Genomics Research and Innovation (CGRI)
- 9. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
- 10. Council for Regulation of Engineering in Nigeria (COREN)
- 11. Department of State Services (DSS)
- 12. Department of Veterinary and Pest Control Services (DVPCS)
- 13. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- 14. Environmental Health Officers Registration Council of Nigeria (EHORECON)
- 15. European Union (EU)
- 16. Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN)
- 17. Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Council (FCCPC)
- 18. Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD)
- 19. Federal Ministry of Education (FME)
- 20. Federal Ministry of Environment (FMEnv)
- 21. Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning (FMFBNP)
- 22. Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH)
- 23. Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI)
- 24. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture (FMIC)
- 25. Federal Ministry of Justice (FMoJ)
- 26. Federal Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (FMSTI)



- 27. Federal Ministry of Transport (FMT)
- 28. Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR)
- 29. Federal Ministry of Women Affairs (FMWA)
- 30. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- 31. Global Environment Facility (GEF)
- 32. High Commission of Canada
- 33. Institute of Public Analysts of Nigeria (IPAN)
- 34. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
- 35. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- 36. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
- 37. International Health Regulators (IHR)
- 38. Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA)
- 39. Local Government Areas (LGAs)
- 40. Medical Laboratory Science Council of Nigeria (MLSCN)
- 41. Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- 42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)
- 43. National Advisory Council (NAC)
- 44. National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)
- 45. National Agency for the Great Green Wall (NAGGW)
- 46. National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs)
- 47. National Assembly (NASS)
- 48. National Biosafety Management Agency (NBMA)
- 49. National Biotechnology Development Agency (NABDA)
- 50. Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC)
- 51. National Defence College (NDC)
- 52. National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
- 53. National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA)

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- 54. National Horticultural Research Institute (NIHORT)
- 55. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)
- 56. National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
- 57. National Orientation Agency (NOA)
- 58. National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA)
- 59. National Universities Commission (NUC)
- 60. National Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI)
- 61. Nigeria Agricultural Quarantine Service (NAQS)
- 62. Nigeria-American Chambers of Commerce (NACC)
- 63. Nigeria Biological Safety Association (NiBSA)
- 64. Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC)
- 65. Nigeria Communication Satellite Limited (NIGCOMSAT)
- 66. Nigeria Customs Service (NCS)
- 67. Nigeria Defence Academy (NDA)
- 68. Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)
- 69. Nigeria Police Force (NPF)
- 70. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)
- 71. Nigeria Society for Experimental Biology (NiSEB)
- 72. Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF)
- 73. Nigerian Environmental Society (NES)
- 74. National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA)
- 75. Nigerian Institute of Medical Research (NIMR)
- 76. Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research (NIOMR)
- 77. Nigerian Institute for Trypanosomiasis Research (NITR)
- 78. Nigerian Institute of Animal Science (NIAS)
- 79. Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)
- 80. Nigerian Medical Association (NMA)
- 81. Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET)



- 82. Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA)
- 83. Nigeria Television Authority (NTA)
- 84. Nigerian Trawler Owners Association (NITOA)
- 85. Nigerian Veterinary Medical Association (NVMA)
- 86. Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)
- 87. Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (OSGF)
- 88. Primary Health Care Centres (PHCCs)
- 89. Private Media Organizations
- 90. Programs for Biosafety System (PBS)
- 91. Sheda Science and Technology Complex (SHESTCO)
- 92. Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)
- 93. Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON)
- 94. State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)
- 95. The Nigerian Bioinformatics and Genomics Network (NBGN)
- 96. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 97. US Embassy
- 98. Veterinary Council of Nigeria (VCN)
- 99. Voice of Nigeria (VON)
- 100. World Health Organization (WHO)
- 101. World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) (former name OIE)
- 102. World Trade Organization (WTO)

List of Acronyms

- 1. BIMs: Biosecurity Incident Management System
- 2. BSATs: Biological Select Agents and Toxins

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3.	BWC:	Biological Weapons Convention
4.	CBRMP:	Counter Bioterrorism Regulatory Management Plan
5.	DSNO:	Disease Surveillance and Notification Officer
6.	EIDs:	Emerging Infectious Diseases
7.	EPROG:	Emergency Preparedness and Response Operational Guideline
8.	EPRS:	National Emergency Preparedness and Response
9.	GAP:	Good Agricultural Practices
10.	GHSA:	Global Health Security Agency
11.	GMA:	Genetically Modified Animals
12.	GMO:	Genetically Modified Organisms
13.	HHP:	Herd Health Plans
14.	HRP:	Human Reliability Plan
15.	IAS:	Invasive Alien Species
16.	ICT:	Information and Communication Technology
17.	IPPC:	International Plant Protection Convention
18.	MDAS:	Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA)
19.	MoU:	Memorandum of Understanding
20.	NAC&BWC	: National Authority on Chemical and Biological Weapons
	Convention	And shares the same and shares and
21.	NBIM: 🕌	National Biosecurity Incident Management
22.	NBSAP:	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
23.	PEP:	Post Exposure Prophylactic
24.	SDGs:	Strategic Development Goals
25.	SOP:	Standard Operational Procedure
26.	SPS:	Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary
27.	TBT:	Technical Barrier to Trade
28.	TETFUND:	Tertiary Education Trust Fund
29.	TWG:	Technical Working Group

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- 30. VBMs: Valuable Biological Materials
- 31. WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan (NBP&AP) is a framework for the design and implementation of programs to facilitate effective communication, collaboration and coordination of activities in a multisectoral biosecurity environment. Biosecurity focuses on preventing theft, diversion or deliberate use of biological science knowledge, materials, technologies, and related equipment to cause harm. It also includes putting measures in place to mitigate naturally occurring and emerging infectious diseases. It effectively guides the identification of these items, their regulation, principles, strategies and implementation plan of intervention activities across all the relevant stakeholders in the biosecurity sector.

The National Biosafety Management Agency Act, 2015 was amended by the National Assembly and assented to by the President, Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2019, mandating the Agency to regulate emerging areas of modern biotechnologies and to ensure biosecurity. The NBMA Act, 2015, (as amended), in section 25(A), states "A person, institution or body shall not carry out gene drive, gene editing and synthetic biology except with the approval of the Agency", and section 3(ja) which stipulates functions and powers of the Agency, says "put in place measures to ensure biosecurity".

In view of the amendment, the NBMA in collaboration with other MDAs developed this NBP&AP to serve as a framework for the design and implementation of programs to facilitate effective communication, collaboration and coordination of activities in a multi-sectoral biosecurity environment.

Biosecurity is a strategic and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and regulatory frameworks (including instruments and activities) that analyse and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life and health, plant life and health, including associated environmental risk. It is the totality of measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of pathogens, toxins, and other related assets against humans, animals, plants, and the environment. It is a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach whose sustainable fortification is necessitated due to the increasing threats of:



- i. climate change altering the range, habitats and spreads of pests and diseases and increasing the potential for severe weather events to assist spread;
- ii. globalization and industrialization, increasing the volume and range of products traded internationally, passenger movements, and the subsequent risks of invasive vectors, pests and diseases entering and establishing in Nigeria;
- iii. population spread, shifting demographics and changing land uses increasing the interface between urban and rural areas and the natural environment, making pest and disease management more complicated to deal with and increasing the risk of zoonoses impacting on human health; and
- iv. rapid advancements in Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, involving biological agents, growing biotechnology industry, available transportation and delivery means (facilitating acquisition, concealment and deployment), transborder criminality, thriving extremism, isolated cases of natural disasters, to mention a few, which portend devastating consequences on human, animal, plant health, the environment, primary industries and food safety.

A bio-secured Nigeria cannot be over emphasized. The National Biosecurity Policy is put in place to draw together diverse activities across Government to protect Nigeria from biothreats whether naturally occurring, accidentally or as a result of deliberate attacks.

Biosecurity is also very important for the management of certain activities in line with international best practices. The mismanagement of some of these activities may affect the well-being of humans, animals, plants and the environment within the ecological entity where such practices take place.

This policy is developed as a result of the increasing need by state actors to acquire and work with pathogenic microorganisms, biological toxins and other biological agents for peaceful purposes, whilst non-state actors may seek to use them to cause harm. For instance, the unsuccessful anthrax attack in Kameido, Tokyo in 1993, the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States and the Covid-19 pandemic with a controversial origin. The approach on how scientists conduct and share results of research on bio-threats has increased international awareness of the threat of bioterrorism.



1.2 GLOBAL CONTEXT AND NIGERIA'S BIOSECURITY LANDSCAPE

Globally, there is an increasing need to enhance biosecurity by restricting the access to harmful biological agents which pose severe threat to human, animal, plant health, biodiversity, the environment and socio-economic development.

Research has identified some countries in East and West Africa as the nations that bear the greatest burden of neglected zoonoses not only in Africa but globally⁽¹⁾. Parts of Africa are also considered potential hotspots for biosecurity issues as a result of zoonotic emergence because of high wildlife biodiversity, rapid human population growth, change in land use and recurrent outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases of zoonotic origin. Nigeria is considered to have one of the highest burdens of endemic diseases globally and one of the four countries that contribute 44% of the world's poorest livestock keepers⁽²⁾.

Taking cognizance of biosecurity threats from Ebola virus, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (Bird flu), lassa fever virus, COVID-19 and pest infestation, the government of Nigeria has shown very serious commitment in ensuring a bio-secured nation. There are different existing National and State Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) carrying out various biosecurity roles. These MDAs which stem from the health, environment, agriculture, humanitarian, disaster management, intelligence services and defence sector etc have been established to limit unauthorized access to VBMs and ensure early detection, prevention, response and control of their intentional and unauthorised release and spread to the environment. However, there is need to enhance synergy amongst these MDAs, address gaps and overlaps as well as strengthen their roles and capacities.

In view of the above, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in August, 2019 assented to a bill to amend the National Biosafety Management Agency Act, 2015, to include "putting measures in place to ensure biosecurity in Nigeria". This amendment therefore authorizes the NBMA to put measures in place to ensure biosecurity which includes the development of this policy, embracing all sector. This policy recognises the roles of all sectors on matters of biosecurity, and accordingly emphasizes the need for synergy to achieve One-health approach being canvassed globally.

1.3 NIGERIA'S BIOTHREAT PROFILE

In accordance with the global trends in the biosecurity environment, the main targets of a bio-terrorist attack in the Nigeria biosecurity space may include laboratory, farms, water



bodies amongst others. The extension of biothreats beyond facilities, ports of entry, is an emerging challenge that countries need to cope with. The emergence of new bio-science technologies is prompting new methods of biological attacks. In the view of this, some major identified biosecurity threats of concern include; Zoonotic biothreats, Laboratory Acquired Infections (LAIs), Exotic biothreats, Stolen biological agents, Stored product pathogens and Pandemic-induced biothreats.

Nigeria has her own fair share of biosecurity challenges. For instance, the nation has been exposed to many disease epidemics and other public health threats. Recent notable Public Health Emergencies (PHEs) of national and international concern to Nigeria include Lassa Fever, Cholera, Meningitis, Yellow Fever and Monkey pox. The arrival of Ebola in Lagos created serious concerns to the global health community and it was thus considered a pivotal event during the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic preventing a global crisis. Nigeria spent approximately \$13million USD responding to the 2014 Ebola response and preventing a large outbreak; a 2% reduction in Nigeria's 2014 GDP would have translated to an economic loss of nearly \$12billion USD.

LIST OF SOME NOTABLE GLOBAL BIOTHREATS

CATEGORY A	And Hak
These high-priority agents include organisms	Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax)
or toxins that pose the highest risk to the	<i>Clostridium botulinum</i> toxin (Botulism)
public and national security because they:	
can be easily disseminated or transmitted	Yersinia pestis (Plague)
from person to person;	variola major (Smallpox)
result in high mortality and have the potential	Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)
for major public health impact;	Hares -
might cause public panic and social	Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses
disruption;	[e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses
require special action for public health	[e.g., Lassa, Machupo])
preparedness.	COVID-19 (COV-SARS 2)
CATEGORY B	Brucella species (Brucellosis)
	Epsilon toxin of <i>Clostridium perfringens</i>
These are second highest priority agents and	Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella
it includes those that:	species, Escherichia coli O157:H7,
are moderately easy to disseminate;	Shigella)



mortality; require specific enhancements of laboratory diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillanceRalstonia solanacearum, Tuta absoluta, Xanthomonas comprestris pv Manihot, Xanthomonas cospestris pv vignicola and Spodoptera frugiperda)Burkholderia Burkholderia Melioidosis)Burkholderia Desudomallet (Melioidosis)Chlamydia psittaci (Psittacosis) Coxiella burnetii (Q fever) Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Rickettsia prowazekii (Typhus fever)Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis, easterm equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis])Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum)Nipah virusHantavirusThese are third highest priority agents and it includes emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass spread in the future because of:Vellow fever		
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because of: availability; ease of production and dissemination; potential for high morbidity and mortality		Tick-borne hemorrhagic encephalitis
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potential for high morbidity and mortality	L - TRILLIAN	Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Multi-drug
		resistant tuberculosis)
and major health impact		
	and major health impact	

1.4 WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES

In order to ensure risk management and resilience, it is important to identify the major weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Nigerian biosecurity system, amongst which are inadequate:

NATIONAL BIOSECURITY POLICY AND ACTION PLAN 2022-2026

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- i. biosecurity policies and programmes with dedicated funding
- ii. robust biosecurity legislative framework
- iii. integrated and periodic review of biosecurity threats
- iv. national biosecurity databases
- v. awareness among scientific/academic community
- vi. integration of security concerns into existing contingency plans for response to biosecurity incidents.
- vii. biosecurity monitoring system for dangerous pathogens
- viii. Biocontainment facilities and logistic mechanisms for Biosecurity
- ix. Others are:
- x. Lack of uniform biosecurity procedures
- xi. Lack of consolidation of institutions and locations with dangerous pathogens and toxin control with training support to reduce the risk of theft or release of dangerous pathogens.
- xii. Sub-optimal institutional biosecurity programmes and national coordination of biosecurity activities

The risk of a catastrophic biological event is also magnified by global travel over international borders, urbanization and terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction. All these factors taken together create an urgent need to strengthen Biosecurity, reduce biological risks, create new approaches to improve infectious disease surveillance and identify and fill gaps to strengthen Biosecurity capabilities of all relevant stakeholders.

There is need to ensure the prevention of biothreats from falling into the hands of malevolent or unauthorised actors, including safeguarding against malicious or unauthorised and intentional acquisition, use, stockpiling, weaponizing potentially dangerous biological agents. Furthermore, it is important to put in place national verification mechanisms of state, non-state actors and facilities handling biothreats.

The National Biosecurity policy will address future biological threats caused by a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak, a deliberate bioterrorism attack or an accidental laboratory release. This Policy will leverage on Prevention, early detection and rapid response measures with the support of trained personnel, rigorous policy and legislative frameworks, coordination and partnerships among relevant stakeholders, and public support.



1.5 STRENGTHS

Despite the rising biosecurity threats, Nigeria is strongly determined to protect her citizens, the environment and other sectors of the economy, and safeguard operations of critical sectors from biological threats. The Federal Government of Nigeria is also conscious of the benefits of emerging biotechnologies and their potentials for enhancing the country's economic prosperity. This is taking into cognisance the need to ensure that they are not applied with intent to cause harm to human health, animal health, plant health and the environment. Hence, there is intensive utilization of national multi-sectoral efforts to ensure that opportunities are exploited, and challenges are effectively mitigated in line with relevant international best practices and peculiar national challenges.





CHAPTER 2

POLICY THRUST

The Policy restates the articulation of the vision of the Federal Government of Nigeria on Biosecurity, sets goals, strategies for minimising pest and disease impacts, maintain food safety, and support responsible industrial productivity. It is intended to remove the capacity gaps and barriers in meeting national obligations under international agreements on biosecurity to which Nigeria is a Party.

The policy will be further reviewed and updated within five (5) years or as the need arises, to ensure consistency in Government policy objectives.

2.1 POLICY STATEMENT

This Policy document aims to foster the integration and harmonization of Biosecurity strategies that will be implemented through One-health approach for the prevention, early detection, rapid response to biothreats and recovery from a biosecurity incident. This Policy has been established to ensure synergy among stakeholders involved in biosecurity sectors for effective and efficient operations of the national biosecurity systems. This is to guarantee best practices in ensuring biosecurity for socio-economic development.

This Policy ensures that all aspects of National and International Agreement, Conventions, Guidelines and other instruments on biosecurity are duly taken into consideration.

2.2 POLICY VISION

The vision of the National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan is to have in place a coordinated, efficient and regulated biosecurity system in Nigeria.

2.3 POLICY MISSION

The mission of the NBP&AP is to institutionalise a harmonised and functional biosecurity system as a fundamental approach to minimizing the risks of biological threats to, humans, animals, plants and the environment.

2.4. POLICY GOAL

The goal of the National Biosecurity Policy and Action plan is to provide a structure for effective coordination of biosecurity activities and services in Nigeria

2.5 POLICY OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan are to:



- a. provide an adequate structure (legal, institutional framework, as well as relevant mechanisms and tools) for effective coordination of biosecurity activities, including prevention, mitigation and response to biosecurity events/incidents.
- b. integrate and institutionalize standard operating systems in all aspects and facilities of biosecurity;
- c. develop and implement relevant guidelines, plans, regulations and strategies for best-practices in all components of biosecurity;
- d. ensure best practices in the safety and biosecurity of human, biodiversity, environment for socio-economic development;
- e. ensure effective surveillance and monitoring systems, preparedness and response mechanisms to biological threats and related disasters;
- f. produce a viable pool of technically skilled and qualified human resources across Nigeria for the management and response to biosecurity issues;
- g. establish a robust and sustainable local and international collaborative network and strong information and expertise sharing system in the management of biosecurity;
- h. ensure the availability of relevant technical and financial resources including facilities and equipment for management of the national biosecurity system; and
- i. ensure public enlightenment and awareness of the populace on biosecurity

2.6 SCOPE OF THE POLICY

This policy shall address biosecurity and its related issues in Nigeria including the prevention, detection, mitigation and response to biosecurity issues. These shall include but not be limited to research and other activities, that use one or more of the agents or toxins listed in Appendix I with the aim or potential to:

- a) enhance the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin
- b) disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin without clinical and/or agricultural justification
- c) confer to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitates their ability to evade detection methodologies
- d) increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the agent or toxin
- e) alter the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin
- f) enhance the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin
- g) generate or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin.



2.7 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

This Policy is guided by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), NBMA Act 2015, (as amended), existing national legislations and international treaties that are relevant to biosecurity to which Nigeria is a signatory to and has ratified. These include among others: the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Establishment) Act, 2018, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corp Act (as amended) 2007, the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, the Animal Disease Control Act and the National Chemical and Biological Emergencies Preparedness and Response Plan (NCBEPRP).

2.8 GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan is guided by the following principles:

- a. Full recognition of biosecurity as a multi-sectoral discipline, with all efforts geared towards a one-health approach;
- b. Collaborative approach and an understanding of the responsibilities of various sectors governments, non-governmental organizations, communities and individuals;
- c. Transparent and science-based development, implementation, monitoring and review of biosecurity programmes;
- d. Effective risk assessment and management that underpins decision-making;
- e. Rapid and accurate detection and identification of new pests, diseases or contamination sources;
- f. An understanding that preparedness, prevention and early intervention form the central focus of all biosecurity activities;
- g. Evolving biosecurity systems based on new knowledge and technologies that match the ever-changing pest and disease threats;
- h. Equitable sharing of cost of biosecurity programmes between beneficiaries and risk creators, where feasible; and
- i. The principle of liability and redress shall apply in line with relevant extant laws.

2.9 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

The National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan will be delivered through a one-health approach – Agriculture, Environment and Human health, with the full knowledge that disease and pest control requires effective collaboration between multi-sectoral



stakeholders. The Strategy will be based on the principle of shared responsibility, recognizing that many government MDAs, non-governmental organisations and the private sector have varying levels of biosecurity responsibilities in their mandate. The NBMA shall in collaboration with the ONSA coordinate activities of stakeholders in the management of biosecurity threats in accordance with risk management principles.

2.9.1. Agriculture and Food Safety

To maintain domestic and international market access, Nigeria will work to minimise and manage high-priority biosecurity threats to the integrity and reputation of its primary produce and food by:

- a. designing biosecurity programs in partnership with relevant stakeholders to manage priority food safety and contaminant risks;
- b. undertaking traceability and surveillance activities to support market access and providing proof of freedom certification for agricultural produce from harmful biological agents;
- c. partnering with relevant stakeholders to develop market-driven systems for onfarm biosecurity such as 'One Biosecurity' for livestock and crop production;
- d. promoting awareness across all primary industries for improved biosecurity including clarity of roles and responsibilities for all relevant sectors;
- e. undertaking prevention, surveillance and response to exotic pests and diseases;
- f. enforcing strict quarantine and other import and export requirements; zero tolerance at different entry and exit points;
- g. establishing a holistic, integrated and preventive approach to reduce risk of contamination along the food chain;
- h. protecting consumers from insanitary, contaminated, unwholesome, mislabelled or adulterated food;
- i. maintaining and building consumer confidence in the food system which will give rise to economic development as a result of increased domestic and international trade in safe food;
- j. carrying out inspection on production and manufacturing along the food chain; and
- k. registering all food products to promote quality and unwholesomeness.

2.9.2. Environment

The Nigerian Government will minimise and manage the entry, spread and impact of pests, diseases and other bio-threats within the country by:

a. the conservation and preservation of the Nigerian Biodiversity;



- b. partnering with all relevant stakeholders, to develop and implement pre-border and border quarantine controls and other biosecurity activities;
- c. supporting research in new and improved pre-border and border quarantine controls and other biosecurity activities;
- d. developing and implementing management plans and programmes aimed at detecting, containing and reducing the impacts of established priority diseases, pests and other bio-threats, and enhanced flora and fauna surveillance and other environmental health concerns;
- e. applying containment protocols for the display or commercial use of potentially invasive organisms;
- f. partnering with air, land, marine and other natural resource managers in managing established priority diseases and disease-carrying vectors;
- g. developing, implementing and exercising disease, pest and other bio-threats response plans;
- h. applying adequate Environmental assessment procedures in Biotechnology projects; and
- i. establishing surveillance programmes for the early detection of new bio-threats to the environment.

2.9.3. Human Health

Biosecurity protects public health. As part of this, relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) will work with all stakeholders to enhance biosecurity by:

- a. establishing and maintaining stakeholder and inter-ministerial advisory groups, for biosecurity issues;
- b. establishing institutional arrangements that engage relevant MDAs, industries, community groups and advisory boards in biosecurity issues of concern;
- c. raising awareness of people's responsibilities in preventing the arrival, establishment and spread of new diseases;
- d. engaging relevant MDAs in surveillance, detection, responses and recovery plans;
- e. building and maintaining an emergency response system to deliver responses to biothreats as required;
- f. conducting emergency response and recovery to biosecurity incidents in a professional manner;
- g. engagement of farmers both for supervision and communication in the event of perceived change in taste of a crop, or health of an animal; and
- h. training, re-training and continuous education on biosecurity.



The Nigerian biosecurity system will be based on shared responsibilities, which will rely on active participation of people from all sectors. Various biosecurity issues will be addressed by MDAs that are legally mandated to detect and respond to bio-threats.





CHAPTER 3 NATIONAL BIOSECURITY POLICY DIRECTION 3.1 NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Nigeria's approach to biosecurity utilizes the One-health approach which is centred on ensuring national values, interests, and objectives that defines us as a people concerning our collective efforts to the advancement of nation-building and international best practices. These factors also guide the formulation of our National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan while strengthening our collective commitment to the delivery of peace, democracy, equity, biodiversity, justice, preservation of human rights, and respect for the rule of law.

Furthermore, our national biosecurity objectives, policy initiatives, and strategic actions are formulated to renew Nigeria's commitment to the protection of our national sovereignty, human security, and wellbeing of the citizenry. This approach to biosecurity is also closely aligned with our commitment to upholding regional and international peace and security cooperation while embracing the norms and conventions of international laws and treaties.

National priorities include but not limited to:

- i. Safeguarding primary industries and food safety;
- ii. Preparedness, Detection, Response to new pests and diseases;
- iii. Minimizing environmental and socioeconomic impacts of pests and diseases;
- iv. Institutionalizing an integrated approach to biosecurity enhancement, involving mutually exclusive supports of the Government, industry and the community;
- v. Building Biosecurity technical expertise;
- vi. Investing in human resource base and infrastructural development;
- vii. Mainstreaming biosecurity into national drive for biotechnology development;
- viii. Auditing of laboratories dealing with dangerous pathogens;
- ix. Developing effective Legal/Regulatory Instruments and Guidelines on Biosecurity system.

3.2 RISK-BASED APPROACH TO BIOSECURITY

The National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan will be delivered through a one-health approach – Agriculture, Environment and Human health, with the full knowledge that disease and pest control requires effective collaboration between multi-sectoral



stakeholders. The Strategy will be based on the principle of shared responsibility, recognizing that many government agencies, non-governmental organisations and the private sector have varying levels of biosecurity responsibilities in their mandate. Thus, this National Policy will:

- a) Ensure that rigorous, risk-based screening systems for evaluating the intentional and unintentional introduction of bio-threats are developed
- b) Identify the pathways by which harmful organism are moved and develop a mechanism to minimize the movement of harmful and potentially harmful organisms.
- c) Strengthen basic border control, risk and impact assessment and quarantine capacity by enhancing the numbers and capabilities of personnel, employing more effective technologies and improving scientific methods.
- d) Develop a rapid response programme with the collaboration of State and local stakeholders to respond immediately to incidences caused by bio-organisms as soon as they are detected.
- e) Establish an easily accessible funding mechanism for emergency action.

3.3 STRATEGIC AREAS OF FOCUS

3.3.1 Strengthening Biosecurity Governance and Coordination

Nigeria recognizes that effective governance models and coordination mechanisms are the basis for strengthening national biosecurity. To this end, a national structure is needed to coordinate and promote the necessary national cohesion at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

3.3.2 Institutional Governance

In Nigeria, there are different existing national and state Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) carrying out various biosecurity roles. These MDAs which include health, environment, agriculture, humanitarian, disaster management and defence sector etc have been established to limit unauthorized access to biothreats and ensure early detection, prevention, response and control their release and spread to the environment. However, there is need to enhance synergy amongst these MDAs, address gaps and strengthen their roles. Hence, the NBMA Act, 2015 (as amended), empowered the NBMA to put in place, measures to ensure biosecurity, through effective communication and collaboration (synergy) with existing MDA's with biosecurity activities in MDA's with its



focus to strengthen her national biosecurity. The NBMA, through its Mandate shall be the focal point for Biosecurity in Nigeria.

3.3.3 Responsibilities of Biosecurity Stakeholders

All stakeholders in the National biosecurity system shall play their specific roles and work in synergy to ensure an effective biosecurity system. Therefore, stakeholders in line with their mandates shall work together to produce a clear aggregation and unified effort to strengthen biosecurity in the country. To this end, a national biosecurity dialogue platform shall be established by the National Biosafety Management Agency.

Objective of Strengthening Biosecurity Governance and Coordination To establish a working partnership and collaborative system for managing biosecurity in Nigeria.							
Strategy:	Actions	Resources	Expected Outputs and Outcome	Responsible MDAs and other organisations			
Ensuring a functional and robust national biosecurity structure	 Establishment of a National Advisory Council (NAC) for annual evaluation; Establishment of a Technical Working Group (TWG) on biosecurity that supports the NAC 	Funding, biosecurity operational systems, legislation, human resources.	 a. A National Advisory Council on Biosecurity (NAC) established; b. A Technical working group is established c. Effective management and coordination of biosecurity 	ONSA, other relevant biosecurity agencies and NBMA as the Secretariat.			
			in Nigeria strengthened.				



3.4 BIOSECURITY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In the event of a biosecurity incident, the Incident Management Plan outlined in the National Chemical and Biological Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan 2020 shall be activated. NBMA and NEMA shall be alerted by any witness or responder and they would in turn notify ONSA to determine the appropriate strategy and approach to be utilized. NCDC, FFS, NSCDC, NAQS, NPF and any other relevant Agency would also be contacted, depending on their mandate and the nature of the incident (as outlined in Appendix II). Notwithstanding the above, any witness or responder could alert any of the stakeholders listed in Appendix II.

3.5 BIOSECURITY DEFENCE CAPABILITY

The development and strengthening of our biosecurity defence approach and capability is critical to ensuring national biosecurity especially in the face of increasing trends in the use of bioweapons by domestic, foreign, transnational state and non-state actors to wreck terror and havoc. The strategy shall therefore develop and strengthen the capability of our military and defence institutions to identify, detect and effectively prevent or manage any form of bio-attack perpetrated against the nation. To this end, NSCDC shall interphase with the Nigerian Armed Forces for effective coordination of activities of relevant stakeholders, development of an effective biosecurity defence plan and training of our military to protect Nigerians and environment from biothreats.

3.6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Nigeria recognizes the evolving and unpredictable nature of biological threats and therefore, is committed to international collaborations to address these biological threats, taking into account support voluntarily provided to countries by international organizations.

In an effort to control the use, misuse and activities involving these dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, related technology and equipment by entities, and the unintended negative effect of bio-threats; Nigeria encourages the one health approach through a coordinated action by mutually reinforcing, complementary and multisectoral cooperation to mitigate a broad spectrum of biological threats.



3.6.1 Coordination Framework for International Engagement

The responsibilities of all stakeholders in government and the private sector including academia will be aligned towards enhancing biosecurity collaboration on the international stage. To this end, organizational structure and protocols for international engagement shall be established by NBMA in collaboration with ONSA.

This includes working closely with relevant partners and international organizations and aligning with international norms in combatting biological threats.

3.6.2 Regional Biosecurity Development

Nigeria shall intensify her involvement and impact on biosecurity concerns in West-Africa sub-region and Africa. On this basis, NBMA and ONSA will spearhead the formation of new initiatives, forums, and mechanisms to augment existing regional collaboration in biosecurity, taking into account the necessity to streamline all efforts, i.e. avoid duplication and create synergies between various projects aimed at strengthening national and regional capacities.

Also, Nigeria will enhance regional capabilities through the identification and implementation of shared approaches for deploying and strengthening regional biosurveillance, information systems and networks to detect, identify, confirm, and respond to biological threats.

3.6.3 International Cooperation

Nigeria is committed to strong international cooperation in biosecurity as part of her shared responsibility to promote global biosecurity.

To this end, our priority is to work closely with other countries and multinational organizations such as the Biological Weapons Convention International Support Unit (BWC ISU), European Union CBRN Centre for Excellence, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO) and World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT), amongst others.

3.7 FINANCING AND RESOURCES MOBILIZATION

The effectiveness of the biosecurity sector is hinged on the availability of adequate funding. The national biosecurity sector, which comprises of multiple stakeholders, needs a proper mechanism for resource mobilization and efficient management to ensure appropriate sharing of funds and resources in the sector.



The objectives are to:

- a. ensure availability of adequate funding to implement biosecurity policies and planned activities; and
- b. establish transparent financial management system and mechanism for resource mobilization.

Strategy:	Actions	Resources	Expected Outputs	Expected Outcome	Responsible MDAs and other organisations
Resource Mobilization: The Federal Governmen t shall make budgetary provisions for Biosecurity stakeholder s and shall adopt a multi- channel funding approach in sustaining and improving biosecurity programs in Nigeria	 a. advocate for adequate budgetary allocation; b. promote partnership and donor support between national and international organisation s; c. foster synergy amongst national and international organization s and the private sector for efficient funding and delivery of strategic biosecurity 	Stakeholder engagement , financial regulations, budgetary appropriatio n.	Adequate budgetary allocation for biosecurity sector	Improved budgetary allocation in Nigeria	NBMA, and other relevant stakeholders
Management and accountability	a. develop a realistic budget and		Mechanisms for regular audit of	Efficient utilization	



framework	ensure that		biosecurity	of	
for resource	the rules of		finances	resources	
mobilization	financial		developed		
	regulations		_		
	and				
	management				
	are followed				
	by				
	biosecurity				
	stakeholders;				
	b. conduct	A 500			
	regular audit	621 188	100		
	on	17 million	Argun		
	biosecurity	All and	Lillight		
	finances	IIIM	MIN	all	





CHAPTER 4 STRATEGIES AND ACTION PLAN

Thematic area: HUMAN HEALTH

Preamble:

While humans are believed to be the most important creation globally, they are at the receiving end of a variety of biological threats. These threats have the potential to affect public health, agricultural practices, food production, international trade and other economic activities, which have resultant effects on human health. Unintentional or intentional release of dangerous pathogens are also avenues for biological threats that affect human health.

Objective(s):

a. ensure that the health of humans is protected from biological agents and toxins that can come through air, food, water and other means; and

b. safeguard human health from infections transmitted through animal to human contact and human to human contact.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
1.Ensuring	a. update food safety	Food	i.amended food	i. improved health	FMOH,
food and water	policies and food safety	safety	policies, regulations	and well-being of	NAFDAC,
is safe for	regulations and guidelines	personnel	and guidelines	the nation	FCCPC,
consumption	to include biosecurity	expertise,	HIM		FMARD,
	b. encourage Good	existing	ii.implementation of	ii.reviewed	NITOA,
	Agricultural Practices	food safety	Good Agricultural	National	NIOMR,
	(GAP) and ensuring	documents,	U		FMWR,



appropriate co-ordination of food safety activities along the value chain; ensure food handlers have sufficient knowledge on good food handling processes c. ensure adequate and appropriate storage facilities (cold stores/ conditioned warehouses, hot silos, air tight compartments or room temperature facilities) d. ensure that all food businesses in urban and rural areas follow the food	standard operating procedures and manuals, other technical and operational resources.	Practices and Food handling practices; iii.introduction and implementation of standard operating procedures;	Biosecurity Policy iii.enhanced protection from biothreats	NVRI, SON, NAQS, NCDC, FMST&I NBMA, Local Food Businesses/ Restaurants, Abattoirs, Media and others
· // //	0		/X	
d. ensure that all food		R	M.	
procedure in rural and urban butcheries and farms; f. coordinate and monitor fishing activities as well as				
activities in the fish markets; g. improve water supply and sanitation;	NITY	AND FAITH		



	 h. tracking and proper disposal of contaminated food items; and i. employ the strategies outlined in border management to manage trade in food and agricultural products 	R		
2. Protection of humans from animal, insect bites and diseases (zoonotic infections)	 a. develop/update database of animal disease vectors, animal and insect diseases as well as zoonotic diseases; b. conduct regular surveillance of animal and insect diseases at Nigeria's borders; c. manage exportation and importation of animals and animal products; d. monitor farm houses and education of livestock and poultry farmers to increase their suspicion index of zoonotic diseases as well as 	Technical expertise, ICT, Trained personnel and training materials, Technical and operational resources	database of zoonotic diseases, animal vectors and insects;reduction in zoonotic diseases.N N N Nii. Database with an updated animal and insect diseaseN	MOH, ICDC, NCS, MARD, IVRI, NIAS, IAQS, IITR, IBMA and ther iosecurity takeholders



	reporting findings to relevant authorities;				
	e. educate people on general pet care/hygiene as well as diseases transferrable from pets;	R	712		
	f. ensure the implementation of the legislation against the establishment of Animal farm estate in the vicinity of residential areas to prevent transmission of Animal to			A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A	
	human diseases; g. strengthen One Health Approach to Public Health Emergency; h. strengthen International	2	A	101	
	Health Regulation (IHR) across all international borders; and				
	i. Strengthen the implementation of Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) and other respiratory diseases	Miller Barn	AND FAIR		
3. Reduction of communicable diseases	a. update database of human diseases in Nigeria;	Technical expertise, ICT,	i. Updated database of human diseases;	Improved public health of the nation	FMOH, NCDC, NIS, FAAN,



 b. ensure all ill travellers are identified and quarantined; c. establish more quarantine centres; 	Relevant documents (illness fact sheets, checklist of wellbeing	 ii. More quarantine centres established; iii. Medical specialists and health personnel skills improved; 	NCAA, FME, NOA, Port Health, Media, Security Agencies, MLSCN,
 d. educate and create awareness of serious communicable diseases of concern; e. strengthen surveillance at the point of entry; 	etc.), Technical and operational facilities.	 iv. Increased number of proficient medical specialists and health personnel; v. Adequate public 	NVRI, NMA, NAFDAC, NBMA, State Governments and others.
f. establish adequate public health laboratories;g. hotspot mapping of biothreats to prioritize seasonal intervention	2	health laboratories established;	
 h. train and re-train medical specialists, caregivers, contact tracers, port health personnel etc.; i. ensure all foreign entrants possess health insurance; and j. adopt all actions in the 	TTY IN	AND FAITH	
preparedness and response strategy of this policy.			


Thematic area: PLANT HEALTH

Preamble:

Plant pests and diseases are a significant social, economic and environmental burden. They can affect primary productivity; access to export markets; public health and infrastructure; conservation of biodiversity; and the natural and built environments—to our individual and collective detriment. These effects can result in increased costs of production, loss of or restrictions to export trade, reduced tourism, loss of biodiversity, greater public health costs and reduced public infrastructure. All strategies for achieving an excellent plant health management system is directed at prevention, eradication and containment.

Objective:

To have in place an effective and efficient plant health management system which ensure human, plants and the environment are safe from pests and diseases

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome (s)	Responsib le MDAs and Organizati on
1. Strengthening of border vigilance, regular surveillance and monitoring in all States of the Federation as well as plant material import and export.	a. strengthen phyto- sanitary measures;	Finance, exotic plants information brochures, booklets and pamphlets, surveillance equipment, plant health experts and other relevant experts, vehicles, survey plans,	i. Enhanced capability to anticipate, detect ii. and respond to emerging plant pests and disease threats	i.Proper containment measures of diseases and potential biothreats ii.Strong surveillance	NAQS, FMARD, ARCN, NIHORT, NCS, NIS, NIOMR, NARIs, NABDA,N BMA and others



b. create awareness	containment facilities,	iii. Proper systems are
on the implication of	etc.	implementation in place
the export/import of		of legislation, iii.Plant material
· · ·		of legislation,
unauthorized plant		continuous
materials;	Area posse	iv. adoption of established.
	AUT TO	appropriate
c. provision of	HITTAC	technology and iv.Strengthened
requisite screening	ALL BATTAN	business research labs
and detection	ALLO LABOR	v. systems in the and systems;
equipment at the	De The	plant health overall
boarders;		sector. wellbeing of plant and the
21	1 Chancel	vi. Adequately general
d. establish effective		equipped for public
screening and		screening of
detection procedures		import/export
of all plant materials		materials.
at all entry borders	(C)	vii. Ensure systems
of the country;		for plant material
		screening is in place.
e. conduct field		viii. Monitoring and
surveillance and		equipment
monitoring	Printer and a second	systems in place.
activities;	anner and	ix. Efficient and
activities,	Shifty	continuous
f. ensure training and	UNITY AND	FA training systems
re-training of	- 144 -	in place.
e		x. Thorough plant
personnel and other		pest and disease
relevant stakeholders		inventory







Thematic area: ANIMAL HEALTH

Preamble:

Pandemics and epidemics that have ravaged the world are often zoonotic in nature. Adopting best biosecurity management practices in ensuring animal health and delivering veterinary services is thus critical to the protection of public health, biodiversity and the environment as well as ensuring increased international trade. These practices must be geared towards preventing the entry of animal diseases, controlling their spread within animal populations or facilities and containing/eradicating such infectious agents/diseases in animals.

Objective(s):

To protect and improve overall animal health, public health and the economy.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
1. To prevent the entry, control the spread and ensure the eradication of	a. ensure all Genetically Modified Animals (GMAs) and their products are subject to biosafety regulatory procedures;	Funding, operational vehicles, equipment and reagents for the laboratories, biosafety guidelines, critical mass of	i. Only Biosafety regulated Genetically Modified Animals (GMAs) and their	i. Improved overall animal health, public health and economy;	VCN, VTH, NAQS, NVMA, AFAN, FMST&I DVPCS,
highly infectious diseases in livestock	b. develop and implement a specific contingency plan for surveillance, prevention and control of biological select agents and toxins	experts in relevant fields, technical support from government, international and	ii. Contingency plan for surveillance, prevention and	ii. Effective Biosecurity measures in place	FMARD, OIE, NVRI, FMT, FMITI, FMENV, FMOH,



(BSATs)/ biothreat	regional	control of		EHORECON,
organisms;	organizations,	biothreats		NBMA and
	emergency response	developed;		relevant State
c. strengthen relevant	strategy and	iii. Laboratories		Ministries
Laboratories for safe	appropriate vaccines	handling		and other
handling of biothreats;	and treatment	biothreats		relevant
	regimens.	developed;		stakeholders.
d. ensure early detection of	MILLARSS	iv. Trained		
an outbreak of a potential	IIIP BS	personnel on	2027	
bio-threat to enable a rapid	S MUP 19	surveillance,	A	
and timely response;		prevention and	78	
		control of		
e. training and re-training of		biothreats in	XIX	
relevant professionals on		place;		
surveillance, prevention and		11	(Qr.	
control of biothreats;				
			1 1	
f. strengthen import			7011	
protocols to prevent entry of	4		J/ [[]	
biothreats into the country;				
g. strengthen quarantine	man	Durm	\mathcal{N}	
protocols and provide	and the second	and with	b.	
quarantine facilities to		100 tol 1	A W S	
prevent entry of biothreats	anney anon	and the second	6	
into the country;	214110	hand		
	INITY AN	D FAITE		
	- 1			



Thematic area: FOOD SAFETY

Preamble:

Strengthening food safety strategies, which refer to the prevention of all sources of biological agents/substances causing food poisoning that could endanger the health of consumers is key because unsafe food creates a vicious cycle of diseases and malnutrition to humans. Foodborne diseases can become a biosecurity threat, which can impede socioeconomic development by straining health care systems, and harming national economies, tourism and trade.

Objective(s):

To protect consumers from food borne diseases.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Strengthening the food safety system to prevent biothreats that could endanger the health of consumers	supply chain b. improve risk	Funding, stakeholders' investments and provisions, development partners, private sector	 i. Integration of threat and vulnerability assessment into food defence structure. ii. SOPs on food handling developed 	Improved safe, quality and wholesome food	NAFDAC, NAQS, FMARD, SON, NiBSA, FCCPC, MLSCN, NCDC, NVRI, FMoH, FMFBNP,



d. strengthen national and international compliance on food safety regulatione. strengthen technical capacity of surveillance officers and food scientistsf. ensure comprehensive baseline data of food handlersg. ensure continuous education for food handlersh. ensure food safety during production, handling, storage and transportationi. strengthen public health laboratories and water sanitation and hygiene (WASH)	 iii. Technical capacity of surveillance officers and food scientists built iv. Baseline information and data of food handlers collected v. Food handlers educated and enlightened vi. Significant reduction in food-borne disease incidence 	FMST&I EHORECON, NBMA and other relevant stakeholders
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Thematic area: AGRICULTURE

Preamble:

The prevention and control of exotic pests and diseases are agricultural challenges. Some biosecurity management practices that can guarantee the building of a secure future for agriculture include; integration of plant, animal and aquatic biosecurity around a common proactive risk-based approach, international cooperation to deal with threats at source and a commitment to focus on using modern innovations to build resilient agro-systems.

Objective(s):

- a. ensure the agricultural sector is protected from pests and diseases;
- b. ensure pest and disease-free agricultural products that enhance trade and contribute to national economic development;
- c. encourage Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) that prevent excessive use of harmful agrochemicals;
- d. support development of resilient food systems; and
- e. strengthen collaboration with regional, national and international bodies or corporations to deal with threats at source.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Building a	a. improve agricultural	Funding, relevant	i. Improved	National economic	FMARD,
system for a	extension and research	legislations, agric	agricultural	assets (livestock and	NAQS,
robust bio-	liaison services;	extension/liaison	extension and	crops) protected	FMENV,
risk		officers and other	research liaison	T	FMST&I
management		technical	services commence	/ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
approach in	b. enhance robust	resources.	ii. Regular		NEMA, ARCN,
all	agricultural		Agricultural		NBMA,

X



agricultural	facilities		facilities		research
practices	inspection;		inspections		institutes and
			executed		other relevant
	c. carry out	ii	ii. National		stakeholders.
	surveillance and	131	environmental		stakenoraers.
	intelligence gathering;	1 a	assets (ecosystems,		
	develop early warning	Heller	flora & fauna		
	systems for emerging	n MIIIN	landscapes)	Alts -	
	pests and diseases;		protected	Sila	
	A	i i	v. pest and weed	P R	
		22	management	A B	
	d. establish a national		practices in place		
	emergency response		v. Safe technologies		
	plan for plant and		in operation	/d/	
	environmental pests	V	i. Effectively	- Alin	
	and diseases;		monitored aquatic	Va	
	7)/		ecosystem	1 (7	
	e. encourage integrated	vi	ii. Capacity of	4611	
	pest and weed	YA	veterinarians,	Y ANN	
	management practices;	ΔI	entomologists and		
	management practices,		plant pathologists		
	6		strengthened	$\langle \cdot \rangle$	
	f. deploy and use of	John Marine	- Anno	mari	
	safe technologies;	at a state of the state of the	and the states		
		and while the	William -	5 2 K	
		324111	and the second second		
	g. ensure strict	ATTY A	ND FAIT		
	monitoring of aquatic	UNITY A	IN TAITH	P	
	ecosystem for effective		- April 10		
	biosecurity				



h. strengthen the			
capacity of			
veterinarians,			
entomologists,			
fisheries extension			
officers and plant	Fa floor of the		
pathologists.			
	ALL DO NOT THE		
AR 1		SPA	

Thematic area: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

Preamble:

Nigeria's rich biodiversity is one of the hubs of global genetic resources. Various internal mechanisms to protect the environment and ensure biodiversity conservation are in place. However, increased trade and travel, impact of climate change, emergence and spread of transboundary diseases, influx of invasive species and emerging new technologies require that the country gives greater attention to biosecurity.

Objective(s):

To ensure that Nigeria's environment and biodiversity are protected against biosecurity threats.

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Strategy	Action(s)	Resource	s Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization



Mainstreaming	a. review the National	Special	i. Biosecurity	Biogooprity throat	FMEnv,
8		1	5	Biosecurity threat-	
Biosecurity into	Policy on Environment and	intervention	mainstreamed into	free environment	FMARD
national	National Biodiversity	fund,	national		GEF, UNEP,
environmental	Strategy and Action Plan	technical	environmental		EHORECON,
programmes, plans,	(NBSAP) to feature	expertise,	programmes;		NAGGW,
policies and	biosecurity;	all existing	ii. National		NESREA,
legislations	-	extant Laws	Biosecurity		NiBSA, NCF,
_	b. present memorandum at	anno	consciousness		NGOs,
	the National Council on	1111118	created	SN2	NBMA
	Environment annually on	IIV Pa	iii. A national	17 .	State/Local
	biosecurity matters;	let had	Biosecurity Day		Government
	bioseculity matters,	all	created		environmental
	c. ensure enforcement of the		iv. A reviewed	1 ml	organization
	Control of Alien and		NBSAP with	IN	and other
	1744		biosecurity	AN	relevant
				U.	
	Regulations;		component		environment
	The second second second				stakeholders
	d. include biosecurity			1011	
	programmes/plans in all	2	Y 4	A 11 / 1	
1	relevant environmental			NO G	
	activities;				
		~			
	e. promote advocacy and	and a second	Dunny m		
	awareness creation on the	Parents 1	in and a series		
	need for protection of		the Sun Is	MA	
	biodiversity;	and some	Sure and the company	0	
		TT AR	Harry L		
	f. set-out annual National	TY AN	D FAITE		
	Biosecurity Day for public	-	- III		
	• • •				
	awareness; and				



g. develop regulations and guidelines for effective implementation of the policy.		
1		

Thematic area: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOSAFETY

Preamble:

Advancement in biotechnology has the potential to transform mankind and the environment and if not properly regulated, could be harmful or misused. Therefore, there is the need to have measures in place to curtail its potential threat to human health, biodiversity and the environment.

Objective(s):

To ensure that advances in biotechnology do not constitute bio-threat to human health, biodiversity and the environment.

		\sim		NOR	
Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Mainstreaming	a. ensure the	Funding, technical	i. National	A bio-threat-free	NABDA,
biosecurity into	implementation of	expertise, operational	Biotechnology	practice of	MLSCN,
biotechnology and	the updated	vehicles, training	Policy updated and	biotechnology	FMST&I,
biosafety	National	equipment, relevant	implemented		FMOH,
ŧ.	Biotechnology	legislations/guidelines	ii. Biosecurity		FMARD,
programmes,	Policy that captures		mainstreamed into		ARCN, BSN,
	Biosecurity;		biosafety and		NBMA and



plans, policies and	b. mainstream		biotechnology	other relevant
legislations	biosecurity into		guideline/regulations	biosecurity
U	biosafety and		iii. Updated biosafety	and
	biotechnology		units to address	biotechnology
	guidelines and	131)	biosecurity in	stakeholders
	regulations;	Ara A	biotechnology	
	c. ensure	ALINA		
	effectiveness of, or	HILKS	iv. Technical capacity	
	strengthen biosafety		built and	
	units to address		strengthened;	
	biosecurity in	2 1 7	S S S	
	Biotechnology and			
	related institutions,			
	and ensure			
	compliance to		New New	
	Biosecurity			
	measures;			
	d. enhance capacities			4
	on risk assessment,	YA		<u>\</u>
	surveillance and	\sim		
	enforcement			
	e. strengthen risk			
	analysis guidelines	- Martin	Lanna .	
	to address	A grange and former	and a second	
	biosecurity	anice the	A Shine and A	
		UNITY AN	ID FAITH	



Thematic area: FACILITY ESTABLISHMENT, MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY (BIOSAFETY LABORATORY, CONTAINMENT FACILITIES, BIOBANKS, ISOLATION CENTRES, etc.)

Preamble:

Facilities provide defined areas where VBMs are handled or stored. Thus, these facilities expectedly should be designed to comply with global standards with regards to requirements of physical containment, operational practice and verification testing to ensure biosecurity. As such, failure to adhere to these standards in the establishment, management or security could render VBMs vulnerable to loss, theft and/or misuse with resultant catastrophic effects.

Objective(s):

- a. provide at each Physical Containment Level (BSL1, BSL2, BSL3, BSL4), facilities that are designed in compliance with best practices and international standards; and
- b. ensure compliance with requirements as regards physical containment, operational practice, performance and verification testing for facilities where VBMs are handled and stored.

	AL				
Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Establishment of	a. establish facilities in	Funding,	i.Enhanced	Appropriately	MLSCN,
well-	geographical areas that are not	technical	protection from	secured and well-	NCDC,
equipped/located	prone to natural disasters. In	expertise,	bio threats	equipped facilities	FMOH, SON,
and secured	areas prone to natural	SOPs,	ii.Standard	established	NiNAS,
facilities across the	disasters, buildings and	Protocols.	Operating	MZ	IPAN,
nation	support systems for	and some	Procedures	0	NAQS,
	containment zones may need	TT AN	developed;		VCPC,
	to meet more stringent	TY AD	iii.Procedure for		FMARD,
	building codes;	and all	certification of		FMWH,
	b. ensure the establishment of		facilities		COREN,
	biosafety laboratory in each		established;		NPF, NBMA
	state of the federation for ease				and other



of analysis or upgrade the scope of existing quality control in laboratories to accommodate biosafety analysis.	iv.Technical expertise identified and engaged in the establishment of	relevant stakeholders
c. design and locate structure of containment zone to withstand internal and external environmental factors;	the facility.	
d. ensure that technical expertise is engaged in the establishment and management of facilities;		
e. ensure that facilities are designed in accordance with international standards and specifications; and		
f. ensure that appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs) are in line with global best practices.	MY XA	

Thematic area: BIOSECURITY INFORMATION AND DATABASE

NATIONAL BIOSECURITY POLICY AND ACTION PLAN 2022-2026

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Preamble:

National Biosecurity Information has variable levels of classification and access. The information is comprised of validated, harmonised and processed data gathered from a variety of MDAs into a national database. Such a database will include an inventory of VBMs, human personnel involved in biosecurity activities, infrastructure and facilities including non-state actors with threat potential and dual-purpose biotechnology activities particularly in academic institutions and security agencies. Therefore, the establishment of a national biosecurity information/ database is greatly needed to provide an efficient, transparent and accountable method of handling and maintaining data securely. In addition, a harmonized national biosecurity information/database will facilitate the sharing of data through the entire system and keep facilities abreast of new developments.

Objective(s):

To develop a harmonised national bio-threat inventory/database.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Establishment and management of national biosecurity database	 a. design and harmonize a national database to link to the sectoral facilities bio-threat inventories and databases; b. ensure all facilities operate and manage VBMs via a coordinated system c. ensure that facilities are designed in accordance with current international standards and specifications to ensure adequate 	Funding, technical expertise, existing facility databases, biosecurity facilities, Cyber security.	 i. Strengthened sectoral bio- threat inventory and database; ii. Established harmonized National biosecurity inventory and database; 	 i. Information of bio- threat agents, location of facilities and skilled personnel with access and authority; ii. Enhanced protection from biothreats 	ONSA, NABDA, NBMA, DSS, NAQS, NPF (National Data Centre) and all biosecurity facilities



	erform inventory/database lits at predefined intervals		iii.	Capacity personnel bui	of ilt:
			iv.	Strengthened	
e. pro	ovide specialized trainings		20	facilities	that
and	l refresher courses for	031-2	121	manage	and
bio	security personnel at all		R4-	operate VBM	ls
lev	els				
f. est	ablish Human Reliability	1117VSS	100		100
Pro	ogram (HRP)				Santes
	A.	10 19	84	1 2111	

Thematic area: BIOTERRORISM AND BIOWARFARE

Preamble:

Bioterrorism is a malicious act of using valuable biological materials to cause harm to human health, biodiversity and the environment. The grave consequences from the impact of bioterrorism to cause harm to large populations and affect the socioeconomic development of a nation, necessitates the establishment of biosecurity measures against bioterrorism.

Objective(s):

To ensure that Nigeria is protected from all acts of bioterrorism and is defended against bio-warfare

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Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and	
					Organization	



1.	a. set up an alert and	Personnel and	i.Comprehensive	i. Contribute to	ONSA, MOD,
L. Establishment	information exchange	technical	Coordinated	international	MLSCN, NPF,
	mechanism to enable		Communication	biosecurity	NSCDC,
of adequate		expertise, funding,		3	,
Prevention and	seamless	sensors and	Network systems	capability and raise	Interpol, NCAA,
Detection	communication among	detection	within all	Nigeria's profile of	NCDC,
systems	all responders	equipment,	emergency	biosecurity within	FMARD, FMoH,
	b.	computers, SOPs	response	the Global Health	NVRI, NAQS,
		for detection,	departments,	Security Agenda	DSS, FAAN,
	640 R	learning and	Investigative	(GHSA)	NOA,
	c. update the database for	training modules	0	ii. build community	OSGF(NAC&B
	all known pathogens	and operational	Cybercrime	resilience	WC), NITDA,
	that can be used as a	resources	agencies and		NSM, (NISEB),
	biological weapons		international		NBMA and
	d. develop broad		collaborators	11P	other relevant
	spectrum vaccines,		established;	1 and	stakeholders
	antimicrobials, and		ii.Database		
	antidotes for protection		containing list of	$\langle \langle \gamma \rangle$	
	against bioterrorism		all pathogens that	4611	
	e. harness scientific	a l	can be used as a	X / / / /	
	knowledge and tools by		bioweapon		
	conducting research		including location	()	
	and development to		and details of	1.7	
	enhance biodefence	mane	organization and		
	capability	and the states	focal persons		
	f. ensure training and	shire starts	updated;	SM2	
	retraining of technical	Dune De genig	iii.Skills of		
	personnel involved in	TAT AT	biological disaster		
	all aspects of	UNITY A	quick response	2	
	countering bioterrorism		team and		
	activities and provide		emergency health		
	them with adequate				
	uncili with aucquate				







	improve disease diagnosis and recovery			
2. Ensuring appropriate Response	 a. strengthen International and domestic cooperation amongst all biosecurity- related Agencies b. harmonize states' response plans into a single all-discipline incident management plan c. enhance the national incident management system d. strengthen the capacity of frontline workers e. operationalize standard disinfection methods for infectious biological agents f. create awareness on bio-terrorism 	and operational	 i. Adequately equipped isolation and treatment centres established; ii. Trained frontline workers; and ii. National incident management plan implemented 	
3. Enablement	a. enhance the support	Funding,	i. Well trained	NBMA,
of Post-	system of affected	personnel	surveillance	ONSA, MOD,
	parties	expertise,	officers;	



Exposure	b. carry out post-	monitoring and	ii. Upgraded care		MLSCN,
Management	outbreak surveillance	surveillance	centres in place;		NPF,
			ii. PEP in place		NSCDC,
	c. track end users of	and drugs, PPE,			Interpol,
	biological weapons	Decontamination facilities	AND DE		NCAA,
	d. put Post-Exposure	racintics	and the second second		NCDC,
	Prophylaxis (PEP) in	atters	TLLLT .		FMARD,
	place	111111111111111		SARSA	FMoH,
	e. upgrade care centres	S MUN B	IP / A	B	NVRI,
	a b	2 1 2	LIG NE	7 S	NAQS, DSS,
					FAAN, NOA,
	f. train Surveillance	100		IN	OSGF(NAC&
	officers			(M	BWC),
				1	NITDA,
	g. ensure post-exposure decontamination process			$\left(\begin{array}{c} \end{array} \right)$	NSM,
	in place			4611	(NISEB) and
	h. ensure proper	9	A Y	A 11 / 1	other relevant
	management of waste				stakeholders.
	generated from			15	
	decontamination	mant	Dimm	\setminus (
	processes	Sand The Sand	- /	The last	

Thematic area: BIOTHREAT RISK ASSESMENT	
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Preamble:	



The Assessment of risks associated with the handling and storage of Valuable Biological Materials (VBMs) within facilities is critical to preventing bio-threats. Facilities shall comply with regulatory requirements by adhering to a combination of physical measures and operational procedures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of VBMs.

Objective(s):

To adequately prepare against, and mitigate bio-threat events

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
1. Establishment and management of National Risk Assessment procedure	 a. Identify, update and profile biosecurity assets (VBMs, equipment, patented data/protocol, experts); b. maintain an inventory of VBMs, and other regulated infectious material in facilities c. identify, define and compile a list of potential threats (internal and external adversaries); 	Funding, bio- risk assessment experts, facilities etc.		J. C.C.	NCDC, NAFDAC, NAQS, FMIC, FMOH, FME, NOA FCCPC, ONSA, DSS, NPF, NCC Media, NBMA and other relevant



	d. identify risks, threats and vulnerabilitiese. determine Biosecurity Risk Levels	25	vi. Timely dissemination of bio-threat events		biosecurity stakeholders
	 f. develop envisaged threats and risk registers g. collaborate with other facilities to harmonize risk assessment processes and share resources/expertise h. train technical staff on risk assessment i. conduct periodic review of bio-risk assessment or as the need arises 			R	
2. Establishment of a Biorisk Management System	 a. establish and strengthen Physical Security measures in biosecurity facilities b. develop and strengthen Personnel Suitability and Reliability criteria c. maintain an inventory and accountability of pathogens and toxins 	barriers, surveillance mechanisms,	 i. Physical security measures in place; ii. Institutionalized personnel suitability and reliability criteria; iii. Information management and security policy in place; 		NCDC, NAFDAC, NAQS, FMIC, FMOH, FME, NOA, FCCPC, ONSA,



d. create information management and security policies and procedures to protect sensitive information e. develop a biosecurity emergency response strategy f. train staff on bio-risk management g. Characterize and categorize VBMs h. develop a register of in- country personnel with biosciences competence of interest d. develop a biobank to collect and secure pathogens of higher consequence/keep an inventory of such in relevant facilities; and d. ensure sustainable funding mechanism a. identify and engage with	AL S	 iv. trained staff on bio- risk management; v. Maintained database of Graded substances; vi. Maintained database of in-country scientists ; and vii. Maintained database for storage facilities 	DSS, NPF, NCC, FMST&I Media, NBMA and other relevant biosecurity stakeholders
relevant stakeholders	communication experts, media	dissemination of bio-threat events;	NCDC,



Communication procedure	b. identify risk	resources,	ii. Stakeholders	NAFDAC,
	communication gaps	emergency	identified and	NAOS,
procedure	 communication gaps c. strengthen the bio-risk communication measure d. sensitize stakeholders on risk management associated with Biothreats; e. provide general information and advice on biosecurity-related hazards and their management; f. monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of communication strategies implemented and improve as deemed necessary g. develop continuous training programs for bio- risk communication team. h. Maintain database of vendors. 	emergency response plan, other relevant stakeholders.	identified and engaged; iii. Regular sensitization Programmes organized	NAQS, FMIC, FMOH, FME, NOA, FCCPC, ONSA, DSS, NPF, NCC Media and other relevant biosecurity stakeholders



Thematic area: B	ORDER CONTROL/MANAGEMEN	NT CONTRACTOR			
	as led to an increase in trade and travel at unprecedented rates. Thus, the nature	Photo I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I			-
effective and in	vasive alien species pose potent and bu	rgeoning threats to both	h natural and agricultur	ral ecosystems	
	the Borders of Nigeria are secured and ould pose a threat to human health, bio			ien Species (IA	S), Pests and
Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsibl e MDAs and Organizati on
Airport (International)	a. review and update passengers' clearance procedures where necessary;	Funding, technical personnel, detector Dogs and Trainers,	i. Standard operating procedures for	Functional Biosecurity system in	NIS, NCS, NAQS, FAAN,



 b. review and update import procedures for airfreight goods where necessary; c. install/upgrade scanning technologies at ports of entry to meet global standards; d. ensure the training and engagement of sniffer dogs at ports of entry; e. review and update inspection procedures for biological materials goods; f. allocate appropriate and sufficient space at the airports as biosecurity control area for processing passengers and their baggage; g. Emplace a craft and cargo tracking system to notify relevant stakeholders on their movement in Nigeria; h. allocate appropriate areas at all ports of entry for biosecurity waste management; i. interception and containment/encapsulation of biosecurity waste at ports and 		iii.	screening passengers and cargos frequently reviewed and updated; Scanning machines installed and detector dogs deployed at the international airports; Biosecurity staff responsible for incoming flights trained on biosecurity processes and procedures; Isolation and quarantine facilities provided at all ports of entry; and Incinerators and sterilizing machines	place at Airports	NCAA, FMOH, DSS, NPF, NBMA
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	shipment back to source countries;j. secure transportation for off-site sound disposal, using accredited facilities/technologies;k. train and strengthen the capacity of Biosecurity Officers (quarantine, port health and others);l. review and harmonize a standardized national protocol for the detection of new pests and diseases; andm. set up and manage pest traps within and around port		installed at all ports of entry		
2. Seaport (International)	 environment. a. revise and update international vessels operation manual to include biosecurity management systems in accordance with seaport management systems; b. revise and update the inspection procedures for imported goods to include the detection of bio-threats; 	Funding, Sniffer Dogs, technical personnel/experts , international vessel biosecurity management systems, transitional facilities such as: container wash,	 i. Frequently reviewed and updated international clearance procedures in place; ii. Biosecurity risks (if any) associated with 	Functional Biosecurity system in place at Seaports	NBMA, NIMASA, NCS, NAQS, NPA, FMT, NSC, NESREA, FMOH,



 c. allocate adequate space for waste management; d. establish biosecurity clearance terminals; e. install transitional facilities (for isolation and quarantine) at ports of entry; f. train Biosecurity Officers; 	traps, relevant guidelines and manuals (seaport	arriving vessels, travelers and cargos efficiently managed; iii. Biosecurity waste appropriately managed; iv. Vessels and cargos appropriately analysed to	NIOMR and other relevant stakeholder s.
 g. develop a nationally harmonised approach to dealing with high-risk containers/vessels; h. develop and review a standardized national protocol for the detection of new pests and diseases; i. set up and manage pest traps within and around port environment; and j. deploy detector dogs at ports of entry. 	AND FAI	ascertain risk level; v. High-risk sea containers cleared in accordance with the Sea Container Import Health Standard; vi. Trained Biosecurity Officers deployed to ports of entry; vii. Clear and comprehensive inspection guidance	



	AT A	BA ETT	material and PPE's available to inspectors at all ports of entry; and iii. Detector dogs deployed at ports of entry.		
3. Land Borders	 a. develop/review and standardise an inspection procedure for carriers, goods and passengers at border checkpoints; b. develop/review and standardise protocols for the handling of passengers and goods of biosecurity risk; c. install appropriate surveillance devices at points of entry; d. strengthen the capacity of biosecurity officers at ports of entry; e. provide containment facilities at ports of entry for isolation and quarantine; and f. deploy sniffer dogs at ports of entry. 	Funding, technical expertise, inspection procedures and manuals, surveillance devices, detector dogs and trainers, existing containment facilities.	 i. Surveillance at land borders improved ii. Inspection procedures for land borders strengthened; iii. Security at land borders improved; iv. Capacity of Biosecurity personnel (Biosafety enforcement officers, quarantine officers); v. detector dogs deployed at ports of entry 	Functional Biosecurity system in place at land Borders	NBMA, relevant Border Agencie s (NCS, NAQS, NIS), DSS, FMOH, NAFDA C and other relevant stakehol ders.



Thematic area: TRANSPORT SECURITY

Objective

The objective is to safely and securely transport VBMs from one place to another.

	CIR ATTA ATTA						
Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output	Expected Outcome	Responsible MDAs and Organizations		
Establishment (where necessary) and strengthening of guidelines for the safe and secure transportation of biological materials	 utilization of a national standardised tracking system for VBMs in transit b. harmonise, review and update regulatory and institutional procedures for documentation and transport of VBMs; c. train and retrain personnel on procedures for documentation 	Funding, SOPs, international guidelines on transport of VBMs, technical expertise, biosecurity facilities.	Regulatory and institutional procedures for documentation and transport of VBMs established	Safe and secure VBMs transport system established	NBMA, all Biosecurity Facilities		
	documentation, packaging and transport of VBMs	UNITY AND	FAITH				



d. develo conting transpo	p institutional gency plans for ort of VBMs.				
J		NITY AND	AITH	S.	



Thematic area: CLIMATE CHANGE

Preamble

Change in climatic conditions is an important factor in the distortion of the environment and ecosystem services. Impacts of pest damage to crops and the environment due to climate change pose significant threat to biosecurity.

Objective:

To mitigate the effects of increased pest incidences, invasive alien species (IAS) and emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) due to climate change.

Strategy	Actions	Resources	Expected Output	Expected Outcome	Responsible MDAs and Organization
1. Assessment and management of pest, IAS and EIDs impact, and engagement with stakeholders.	control of pest incidences, IAS and EIDs	Funding, pest management plans, stakeholders, weather information, extension workers.	Management strategies on pests, EIDs and IAS in place	Best pest management plan and practices in place;	NBMA, NIMET, FMARD, FMENV, NIGCOMSAT, FMST&I, FMOH and other relevant biosecurity and environment related stakeholders.



e. develop relevant framework for an		
integrated pest		
management system.		

Thematic area: BIOETHICS

Preamble

Professional standards and conducts that guides research and development in Bio-sciences is of utmost importance in biosecurity. All aspects of bioethics such as agricultural, medical, research, environmental, public health, etc. are vital and should be taken into consideration.

Objective:

a. build strong cooperation and synergy between regulatory agencies and professional bodies; and

b. uphold the moral and ethical principles of scientific practices that involves the use of VBMs in medical, agricultural and environmental research as it concerns the biosecurity of the Nation

Strategy	Actions	Resources	Expected Output	Expected Outcome	Responsible MDAs and Organization	
Ensure proper implementation of the code of bioethics.	 a. develop/review/update the code of bioethics for research facilities to incorporate biosecurity concerns; b. coordinate the implementation of this 	operational	 i. Capacity of bio-science researchers built on bioethics; ii. Safe research which takes into account ethical 		FMST&I, FMOH, NABDA, NCDC, NIPRD, FMoJ, SON, NVRI, NIMR, ARCN NAFDAC, NBMA and other relevant academic institutions and stakeholders.	



 e. Initiate a governance mechanism for samples and associated data; f. enforce access benefit sharing and compliance mechanism; and g. identify expertise in bioethics in Nigeria. 	code of bioethics across all research facilities; c. regular training of regulatory officers and research staff on importance of adhering to the codes of bioethics; d. ensure that ethical considerations are taken into account during risk analysis and counter measures to biothreats;	consideration established iii. Governance mechanism for the management of samples and associated data in place
sharing and compliance mechanism; and g. identify expertise in	mechanism for samples	Ink for
	sharing and compliance	
		the second s



Thematic area: SURVEILLANCE, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Preamble:

Surveillance, preparedness and response are critical elements of any efficient biosecurity system. Surveillance consists of information gathering with special attention to technical and biological aspects as well as the monitoring of bio-threat incidents. Its efforts are usually aimed at targeting the most relevant biological security threats in order to prioritize preparedness and response measures. Preparedness and Response on its part, is the ability to quickly mitigate, eliminate or contain the effect of a dangerous incident that involves VBMs and Toxins.

Objective(s):

- a. strengthen surveillance across all facilities containing biothreats, including at points of entry, for effective monitoring and timely detection of biosecurity threats and incidents;
- b. establish a National Response Plan against bio-threat incidents;
- c. Integrate the National Response Plan for biosecurity incidents into the existing National Chemical and Biological Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (NCBEPRP);
- d. have a functional National Emergency Preparedness and Response strategy to key into the existing National Response Plan; and
- e. ensure the availability of rapid measures required to counter any danger caused by bio-threat incidents.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization			
1. National Biosecurity Incident Management	a. update and implement a coordinated Biosecurity Incident Management System (BIMS) for	specific	i. A coordinated Biosecurity Incident Management System (BIMS) for	Improved surveillance, preparedness and	NBMA, NCDC, NAQs, FMARD, FMEnv,			


System (NBIMS)	preparedness and response and develop one for surveillance; b. establish and institutionalize a structure for an incident management team; c. conduct joint training and simulation exercises for all relevant stakeholders	standards and procedures.	surveillance, preparedness and response to bio-threats in place; and ii. An Incident Management Team structure developed and institutionalized	response to biothreats	FMOH, Media, Security Agencies, FMST, NEMA, NPF,ONSA, DSS, OSGF (NAC&BWC), State governments and other relevant stakeholders.
2. Strengthening of Surveillance system within International, Regional and National jurisdiction	 a. develop a harmonized guideline for biosecurity surveillance; b.review and update the biosecurity surveillance guideline regularly; c.initiate a coordinated cooperative surveillance effort between Nigeria and 	Funds, technical expertise, frontline workers, bio- threat inventory, existing surveillance systems.	 i. A harmonized guideline for biosecurity surveillance developed and regularly reviewed; ii. Coordinated cooperative surveillance efforts between sub-regional governments initiated; and 	1	FMEnv, NCDC, MoFA, MOD, FMOH, NAQS, FMARD, NBMA, Regional bodies and other relevant stakeholders.



	other regional bodies (ECOWAS etc.); and d.conduct regular training for surveillance officers and relevant personnel.	R	iii. Surveillance officers and relevant personnel regularly trained	
3. National Emergency Preparedness and Response Strategy (EPRS)	 a. regularly review the National EPRS; b. develop Emergency Preparedness and Response Operational Guidelines (EPROG) for biosecurity facilities; c. establish an Advisory Committee at NBMA level; d. establish emergency response hotlines at National, State and Local levels; e. establish containment and confinement facilities for controlled organisms that may pose threat to human 	Funds, technical expertise, animal and plant emergency response plans, existing legislations	 i. Harmonized National EPRS developed and regularly reviewed; ii. Established EPROG in all biosecurity facilities nationwide; iii. National Advisory Committee for EPRS established; iv. Emergency response hotlines established at all levels of government; v. Containment and confinement facilities for controlled organisms established; vi. An emergency response action plan for incursion of 	NBMA, NCDC, NAQS, VPCS, NEMA, SEMA, Federal and State Ministries of Health, Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture, Federal and State Ministries of Environment, Biosecurity Facility operators and



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	health, biodiversity and the		reoccurring bio-		other relevant
	environment;		threat(s) initiated; and		stakeholders.
			vii. Regular training of		
	f. initiate/activate and	43	officers on emergency		
	periodically simulate an		preparedness and		
	emergency response action	TUMANN	response conducted.		
	plan for incursion of a bio-		XIIIII		
	threat; and	IIIP'NO	And Sub	lus.	
	g. conduct regular training on emergency preparedness	20		3	
	and response for				
	biosecurity personnel				
4. Enhancing	a. establish coordinated	Funds, National	i. A coordinated linkage		NBMA, ONSA,
Biosecurity	linkage between	EPRS, technical	structure between	7	Biosecurity
intelligence	biosecurity officers and	expertise	biosecurity officers and	10	stakeholders and
sharing	security officers at		security operatives	111	security
between	International, Regional		established; and		operatives
biosecurity	and National levels; and		ii. Quarterly technical		-
officers and	and the second s	mul l	meetings between		
security	and a second		security operatives and		
operatives at	25 25 10		biosecurity officers		
International,			institutionalised		
Regional and		TTY AND	FAITH		
National			HIH		
levels					



		b. conduct technical meetings between security operatives and Biosecurity officers where the need arises	RA		
5.	Counter Measures Response Plan	 a. facilitate procedures for the immediate availability of counter measures for bio-threats; b. facilitate rapid Research and Development for measures to contain biothreats; and c. establish and maintain partnerships with all relevant stakeholders at all levels. 	Funding, National EPRS, technical expertise, operational standards and procedures.	 i. A system for rapid availability of counter measures for bio-threats established; ii. Rapid research and development procedures to contain bio-threats facilitated; and iii. Partnerships with all relevant stakeholders at all levels established and maintained 	NBMA, MOD, NPF, BPP, NOA, relevant research institutes and other biosecurity stakeholders

Thematic area: WASTE MANAGEMENT

Preamble:

A good waste management system includes sustainable activities and actions required to manage waste from generation to disposal. The development of a sustainable waste management system for hazardous biological waste is crucial for the prevention of possible threats to human health, biodiversity and the environment which may arise from mishandling.



Objective(s):

To minimise risk to human health, biodiversity and the environment due to improper waste management.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Enhancement of a sustainable waste management system	 a. adopt harmonised protocols for sorting, labelling and treatment of wastes before disposal; b. organize and implement safe and environmentally friendly methods for waste management; c. develop relevant public/private partnership for proper management of hazardous biological waste; d. ensure training of all relevant stakeholders on safe and secure 	Funding, waste management guidelines and legislation, waste management facilities.	 i. Innovative and sustainable waste management culture established ii. Awareness on appropriate waste management created; iii. Relevant legislation, standard procedures, best practices, ethical and social aspects of waste management in Nigeria harmonised; iv. Contribution to national economy through sustainable 	Enhanced sustainable waste management system	NBMA, FMEnv, NAFDAC, FMST&I, FMOH, NESREA, State and Local Government Environmental Protection Boards, SMEDAN, FME, LAWMA, FMIC, NOA, NUC, CSOs and other



hazardous biological waste management e. carry out national orientation	waste management achieved; v. Public/private enterprises collaboration in	relevant stakeholders.
on waste management and awareness on existing accredited hazardous biological waste disposal facilities in the country;	waste collection, recycling and disposal strengthened.	
 f. incorporate and streamline biosecurity into waste management practices, policies, projects and planning; g. harmonise and enforce sustainable waste management guidelines and legislation on 		2 N
h. develop mechanisms for the conversion of biological wastes to energy.	TY AND FAITH	



Thematic area: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Preamble:

The national biosecurity system requires a competent workforce to handle biosecurity issues. This can be achieved through recruitment of qualified personnel, training and retraining of officers as well as provision of a conducive work environment.

Objective(s):

To provide a workforce and environment which fosters optimal productivity

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
 Recruitment of competent workforce Training and retraining of biosecurity officers 	 a. embark on capacity needs assessment; b. recruit relevant personnel as may be required a. embark on training needs assessment; b. formulate capacity strengthening and development plan; 	training materials, biosecurity curriculum	 i. Proficient biosecurity workforce in place ii. Critical mass of biosecurity experts in place 	Conducive work environment and competent biosecurity workforce established.	all



	c.engage stakeholders on capacity development;				
	d. develop biosecurity curriculum for relevant tertiary institutions;	251	B		
	e. engage with national and international institutions to provide specialized training for Biosecurity	TA R	All Sale	B	
3. Providing a conducive work environment	officers.a.provideanappropriatemotivation and reward system forthe workforce			R	

Thematic: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Preamble:

Research is central to acquiring innovative ideas and methods to promote development. Stakeholders in biosecurity need to constantly conduct research in order to identify best practices in the management of VBMs in the country. They also need to be abreast with global biosecurity issues to ensure that Nigeria is a step ahead of emerging threats and trends in the biosecurity sector.

Objective(s):

a. To enable biosecurity stakeholders' access to biosecurity related data;

b. To generate, access and utilize scientific data to assist in the prevention, detection or management of VBMs that impact biosecurity;

c. To strengthen the capacity of biosecurity research ethical committee.



Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization		
Generation, accessibility and utilization of research data and information on biosecurity.	 a. harmonize existing information on VBMs and diseases nationally; b. collaborate with relevant national and international organisations to provide information on VBMs and disease incidents; 	Funding, research data, existing VBMs data and information, existing policies and legislations, peer-reviewed journals, national and global research institutions, international biosecurity organisations.	 i. Certified biosecurity research facilities in place and regulation enforced; ii. Research data compiled and utilized; iii. VBMs information and data available and accessed by 	Improved research, development and its implication on biosecurity	NCDC, NVRI, NAQS, NPHCDA, NIMR, ARCN, FMENV, MoFA FMARD, FMST, NABDA, MLSCN, TETFund, NBMA and other relevant stakeholders		

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Thematic: INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Preamble:

Global trade and the movement of people increase the spread of valuable biological materials, either intentionally or unintentionally. Biosecurity measures which seek to allow trade and movements of people while preventing incursions that could lead to the establishment of unwanted pests, pathogens, and weeds will therefore need to be strengthened.

Objective(s):

To ensure that trade between Nigeria and its international trading partners is in accordance with global biosecurity standards.

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Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Strength ening Fair trade agreeme nt	a. ensure trading partners comply with technical Barrier Trade (TBT) and sanitary and Phytosanitary measures;	Funding, trading partners, international trade agreements, biosecurity legislation, SPS, Codex Alimentarius, OIE, IPPC.	i. Trading partners in compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary measures;	J.C.	Relevant MDAs and other Organisations
	b. ensure that traded articles that may pose risk to human health, biodiversity and the environment are subjected to biosecurity regulations;	UNITY AN	ii. International trade compliant with international biosecurity		



c. strengthen trade agreements to ensure	standards in place;	
biosecurity standards are maintained;	10 m	
d. ensure adoption of fair trade;	And been	
e. ensure dispute settlement procedures	STUDEN	And a

Thematic area: COMMUNICATION

Preamble:

Communication in biosecurity refers to the exchange of classified or unclassified information amongst relevant national and international stakeholders on a need-to-know basis. The key component of communication in biosecurity include data sharing and management, information security and technology services.

Objective(s):

- a. improve information sharing between relevant national and international biosecurity stakeholders;
- b. ensure timely dissemination of factual information; and
- c. equip the national biosecurity sector with security information and ICT delivery resources

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Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization	



1. Improving information sharing and information security amongst relevant stakeholders	secure sensitive biosecurity information; limit access to sensitive information to only authorised personnel; publish content of the national pest and disease outbreak status periodically; coordinate communication preparedness activities for biosecurity incidents; ensure that case management plans, research data and relevant materials are shared among stakeholders and the public; train and retrain personnel on biosecurity communication; and	Funds, communication guidelines and strategies, national emergency preparedness and response strategy, trained communication personnel Funds, media houses, secondary and tertiary institutions, technical expertise	i. ii. iii.	Information and data sharing among stakeholders and the public achieved and established; Biosecurity information and communication officers designated; and Central database for biosecurity information sharing established.	Improved information sharing and information security	NBMA, NITDA, NOA, NCC, FMIC, NEMA, ONSA, NIGCOMSAT, INTERPOL, BON, and other relevant stakeholders.
	designate biosecurity information and communication officers)(
2. National database and ICT services	develop a central information database for the national biosecurity system and ensure access for all relevant biosecurity stakeholders where applicable; and	JITY AN	D	FAITH	5	



ensure that relevant biosecurity stakeholders are	
equipped with ICT services	
for information repository and	
dissemination	

Thematic area: EDUCATION, ADVOCACY AND OUTREACH

Preamble:

Biosecurity education and advocacy involve steps and actions taken to ensure that the public is well informed on biosecurity and related issues, which will in the long run, lead to a safe and secured nation. It is therefore imperative for government to identify effective ways to create awareness among scientists and the public about their social responsibility regarding biosecurity.

Objective(s):

To increase public awareness on biosecurity

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible	
	1 south of		and the second		MDAs and	
		a state	and the second second second	the second se	Organization	
1. Integration	a. develop a curriculum on	Funds,	i. Biosecurity	Biosecurity integrated	FME, NOA,	
of biosecurity	biosecurity for secondary and	media	integrated into	into the Nigerian	NUC, FMIC,	
in the Nigerian	tertiary schools;	houses,	the Nigerian	educational system	NERDC,	
educational	b. introduce and maintain	secondary	educational		NBMA and	
system	biosecurity as a course in all	and tertiary	system;		other relevant	
	tertiary institutions;	institutions,			stakeholders.	



	 c. introduce and maintain biosecurity as a topic in one of the science subjects in secondary schools; d. promote research on biosecurity at the postgraduate level; and e. provide open source teaching and research materials relevant to biosecurity online. 	technical expertise	 ii. Biosecurity introduced and maintained as a course in tertiary institutions iii. Biosecurity research at postgraduate level promoted 		
2. Establish an advocacy system for biosecurity	 a. Organise annual national biosecurity conference; b. organise quarterly press briefings; c. establish collaboration between the biosecurity content of the	Funds, media houses, secondary and tertiary institutions, technical expertise	Annual national biosecurity conference held	National biosecurity advocacy system in place.	FME, NOA, NUC, FMIC, NERDC, NBMA and other relevant stakeholders
	between the biosecurity sector and media organisations; d. ensure effective collaboration between scientific community and policy makers; e. ensure coordinated public awareness for case management				
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opportunitie	Nations affirms gender mainstreaming s to participate in the provision of so gnises that these groups, when giver	olutions in vari	ous societal issues. In t	his vein, the Federal Gove	rnment of
Objective(s): To ensure	e the active involvement of all gende	er in the biosec	eurity system.	R	
Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible
Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	MDAs and
Strategy Enable gender participation through education and inclusion in all aspects of biosecurity	Action(s)a. Ensure gender balance in all aspects of biosecurityb. empower youths, women and differently abled individuals with resource materials on biosecurity; and	Resources Funds, resource materials on gender inclusion, SDGs resource materials	-	Expected Outcome(s) Enablement of gender participation in biosecurity	



Thematic area: BIOSECURITY ENFORCEMENT

Preamble:

Biosecurity enforcement ensures compliance with biosecurity rules and regulations in the handling of VBMs and diseases. The enforcement of the biosecurity system in Nigeria requires vigilance at every port of entry, biosecurity facilities and the conduct of researches involving potentially harmful VBMs.

Objective(s):

To ensure compliance with biosecurity legislations.

Strategy	Action(s)	Resources	Expected Output(s)	Expected Outcome(s)	Responsible MDAs and Organization
Ensure adherence to biosecurity regulations	 a. create awareness on biosecurity regulations; b. monitor and inspect biosecurity facilities, including national and international borders; c. collaborate with relevant national and international bodies for efficient biosecurity enforcement; d. train and retrain personnel on best biosecurity procedures; 	Funding, biosecurity legislations, SOPs, import and export certification guidelines of agriculture, technical expertise	 i. Awareness of biosecurity regulation created ii. Biosecurity facilities monitored and inspected iii. Collaboration with national and international bodies for biosecurity enforcement achieved 	Efficient biosecurity enforcement system established.	NBMA, all biosecurity stakeholders and law enforcement Agencies.



e. review, update and harmonise	iv. Trained personnel
all technical documents for	on biosecurity
enforcement;	procedures
f. develop a robust biosecurity enforcement plan;	v. Technical documents for enforcement
g. prosecute for non-compliance	reviewed, updated
where necessary; and	and harmonised
h. monitor researches involving potentially harmful biological agents	THE STA





CHAPTER 5

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 5.0 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is a participatory process that is integrated into policy, programme and project planning, design and implementation to encourage dialogue between stakeholders on the progress made on development. Its purpose is to help ensure accountability, and demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency with which the National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan will be implemented. In addition, it is intended to ensure that programmes and projects in the National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan stay on track, while detecting problems to reduce the risk of major cost overruns or time delays.

Monitoring will employ management tools for improving programme and project performance in terms of improving organisational delivery and risk management. Evaluation on the other hand, shall involve the process of analysing or interpreting collected data to establish relationships between results and programmes or projects, as well as their effects and overall impacts, to learn from past successes and challenges and inform decision-making so that current and future initiatives can deliver valuable results, improve people's lives, and expand our options.

Objectives

- 1. To keep track of how well biosecurity policy and legislation is being complied with in Nigeria;
- 2. To ensure that the implementation of the policy is on track, according to agreed plans and schedules;
- 3. To verify that the partnership arrangements for implementing the National Biosecurity Policy are suitable and effective; and
- 4. To provide lessons and recommendations that will strengthen the National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan to make it more effective.

Strategies

The National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan shall focus on the development of appropriate monitoring and evaluation methodologies and systems for tracking biosecurity activities and services. The Monitoring and Evaluation System is built on three



main pillars that ensure that the desired results are delivered in a functional, effective, and efficient manner:

- i. **Enabling environment:** People, partnerships and planning required to support data use;
- ii. **Data and Information:** Mechanisms for collection, capturing and verification of data for making decisions; and
- iii. **Decision Making:** Dissemination and use of data for decision making.

Principles & Criteria

- i. M&E planning shall be an explicit part of project-level planning and budgeting for biosecurity activities.
- ii. Implementation of the M&E plan, which includes SMART -Specific, Measurable, Achievable and Attributable, Relevant and Realistic, and Timebound, Trackable and Targeted- indicators shall be part of programme and project monitoring and supervision.
- iii. The relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts, and sustainability of programmes and projects will be the focus of evaluations.
- iv. After their implementation, all programmes and projects will be evaluated.
- v. All MDAs must keep track of how this requirement is being implemented in their Biosecurity programmes and projects.

Actions

- a. Establish a functional strategy, monitoring and evaluation system that includes clear organizational structures, M&E functions, and a feedback mechanism.
- b. Increase, strengthen and maintain human capacity for M&E.
- c. Strengthen partnerships for M&E System Planning, Coordination, and Management.
- d. Institutionalize M&E frameworks/Logical Frameworks that outline the objectives, inputs, outputs, and outcomes of programs/projects, as well as the indicators that will be used to measure and verify all results.
- e. Maintain costed M&E Work Plans that show how personnel, time, materials, and money will be used to accomplish the M&E functions.
- f. Improve M&E communication, advocacy, and culture within the implementing MDAs.



- g. Conduct routine Programme Monitoring to ensure that program/project activities are leading to the achievement of set objectives, as well as to collect and analyse data regularly.
- h. Conduct national surveys and surveillance regularly, and use data to assess the progress of related programs and projects.
- i. Collect data for national and sub-national databases that are relevant, reliable, and valid.
- j. Supervise and audit data to identify and suggest ways to improve the M&E system, as well as verify data for accuracy and validity.
- k. Evaluate and strengthen the operational standards and procedures used by biosecurity facilities and implementation organizations to improve organizational learning and share success with other stakeholders.
- 1. Disseminate and use data to inform future activities, either to reinforce or change the implemented strategy and to ensure accountability.
- m. Conduct quarterly biosecurity meetings and two annual NAC meetings for decision-making.

Resources

Funding, biosecurity management and operating system, biosecurity operational standards, stakeholders' feedback, and technical expertise.

Outputs

- a. A functional monitoring and evaluation system for National Biosecurity Policy and Action Plan developed;
- b. Biosecurity operational standards and procedures for implementing organizations frequently evaluated and strengthened;
- c. Biosecurity Monitoring and evaluation plans and frameworks developed and institutionalized;
- d. Annual evaluation by the National Advisory Council (NAC) conducted;
- e. Feedback mechanism for public monitoring of biosecurity services developed.

Outcome(s)

Improved organizational delivery and control for biosecurity risk and hazards.



RESPONSIBLE MDAs/ORGANISATIONS

NBMA, NAC, FMFBNP, FMEnv, FMoH and other relevant stakeholders.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

In this Policy and Action Plan document :

Administrative area	Dedicated room or adjoining rooms that are used for activities that
	do not involve Valuable Biological Materials.
Animal cubicle/room	A room or space that serves as primary containment, designed to
	house large-sized animals such as livestock or small sized animal in
COR.	open cages.
Animal pathogen	Any pathogen that causes disease in animals, including those derived
a w	from biotechnology.
Appropriation audit	Inspection conducted to ascertain that funds are expended for the
211	purpose they were intended.
Authorized personnel	Individuals who have been granted access to an area by the
	appropriate authority
Biohazard	Any biological substance that poses a threat to human health,
TALL	biodiversity or the environment.
Biosecurity Incident	A mechanism to provide guidance on the management of biosecurity
Management System	incident responses and initial recovery operations.
Biosecurity Intelligence	The screening of various sources of information for signals of
1 Action of the second	emerging biological threat issues.
Biosecurity Risk	Involves the identification of risks arising from the possession of
Assessment	Valuable Biological Materials, and determination of appropriate
	mitigation strategies.
Biosecurity Stakeholders	These are organizations (government and non-government),
	individuals or groups with mandates, interest or concern in
	biosecurity.
Biosecurity	Strategic and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and
	regulatory frameworks (including instruments and activities) that
	analyse and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life
	and health, and plant life and health, including associated
	environmental risk.



Bioterrorism

Bio-threat

Bio-threat database

Budgetary allocation

Case Management

Classified Information

Compliance Confinement

Containment

Containment level (CL)

Controlled access system

Security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional and unauthorised release of pathogens, toxins, and other related assets against humans, animals, plants, biodiversity and the environment.

Bioterrorism refers to the intentional release of biological agents or toxins for the purpose of harming or killing humans, animals or plants with the intent to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or socio-economic objectives.

The danger posed by a harmful biological agent - valuable biological materials (VBMs) - produced by a variety of organisms with the potential to spread and cause an outbreak.

A system that stores and organizes biosecurity information concerning all VBMs

The amount of funding/resources designated to each expenditure line.

The collaborative process of assessment, planning, facilitation, caregiving, coordination, evaluation and advocacy for a particular case of bio-threat incident.

Any material or resource that is deemed to be sensitive, requires protection and access restriction.

To conform to a rule, such as a Policy.

The restriction of biological threat(s) to a place/location to avoid or minimize it's spread.

The combination of physical design parameters and operational practices that protect personnel, the immediate work environment, and the community from exposure to biological materials. It is also the action of keeping biological threat(s) incident under control or within limits.

CL) Minimum physical containment and operational practice requirements for handling Valuable Biological Materials or toxins safely in laboratory, large scale production, and animal work environments, depending on the severity of the risk.

ystem A physical or electronic system designed to allow access to only authorized personnel.

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Countermeasure(s) The measure, action or procedure taken to offset a biological threat(s) incident. Disease A disorder of structure or function in humans, animals, and plants or one of its parts, resulting from infection or intoxication. Enforcement The act of compelling compliance or execution of a law or rule. Facility Structures or buildings, or defined areas within structures or buildings, where VBMs are handled or stored. **Food safety** processes and procedures which ensure that all foods made available to consumers are safe. **Hazardous Wastes** By-products that have substantial or potential threats to public health or the environment. Implementing These are organizations within the biosecurity sector that implement **Organizations** biosecurity policy and legislation in accordance with their enabling and other related laws. An event or occurrence with the potential of causing injury, harm, Incident infection, intoxication, disease, or damage. **Information Security** the practice of protecting information or data from unauthorized access, use, misuse, disclosure, destruction, modification, or disruption. Inspection An organized examination or formal evaluation of an established standard. Inventory A record of assets (biological and non-biological) associated with a containment zone identifying Valuable Biological Materials in storage both inside and outside of the containment zone. Monitoring To systematically collect, analyse and use information to trail a program's growth towards achieving an objective. Operational **practice** Administrative controls and procedures followed in a containment requirements zone to protect personnel, the environment, and ultimately the community, from Valuable Biological Materials. **Operational Standards** Policies, procedures, and protocols employed in providing the dispatch of biosecurity services and related activities, and the performance objectives which define the minimum acceptable level of service provided by the organization.



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Pathogen	A microorganism capable of causing disease or infection in humans,
	animals or plants.
Physical Containment	barriers in the form of engineering controls and facility design used
	to protect personnel, the environment, and ultimately the
	community, from Valuable Biological Materials
Personnel Suitability and	The term used to describe the criteria that individuals meet before
Reliability	they are employed.
Risk	The probability of an undesirable event occurring
Risk management	the identification, evaluation and prioritization of risks followed by
- MA	coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize,
ET &	control or mitigate the effects.
Risk management plan	A series of activities that provide the foundation and organizational
NE	arrangements for designing, implementing, monitoring, reviewing,
	and continually improving risk management throughout the
- MX	organization.
SOPs (Standard	Documented processes to ensure consistent service and products'
Operating Procedures)	deliveries.
4611 5	A document that standardizes safe work practices and procedures for
JIMA K	activities with Valuable Biological Materials in a biocontainment
	facility.
Unclassified Information	a material or resource that is assigned as official information which
want	is not considered to be Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret but is not
	publicly accessible without authorization.
Valuable Biological	may include pathogens and toxins, as well as non-pathogenic
Materials (VBMs)	organisms, vaccine strains, genetically modified organisms
JU	(GMOs), cell components, genetic elements, and extra-terrestrial
	samples.
Zoonoses	Diseases that are transmissible between animals and humans.
Zoonotic Pathogen	A pathogen that causes disease in humans and animals, and that can
	be transmitted from animals to humans and vice versa



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Appendix I

Agents and Toxins

The following agents and toxins have the potential to pose a severe threat to human, animal, or plant health, or to animal or plant products. Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)

CATEGORY A	
These high-priority agents include	Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax)
organisms or toxins that pose the highest risk to the public and	<i>Clostridium botulinum</i> toxin (Botulism)
national security because they:	Yersinia pestis (Plague)
Can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person;	variola major Smallpox
Result in high mortality and have	Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)
the potential for major public health impact;	Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses [e.g., Lassa, Machupo])
Might cause public panic and social disruption;	COVID-19 (COV-SARS 2)
Require special action for public health preparedness.	
CATEGORY B	Brucella species Brucellosis
State anily	Epsilon toxin of <i>Clostridium perfringens</i>
These are second highest priority agents include those that:	Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, <i>Escherichia coli</i> O157:H7, Shigella)
Are moderately easy to disseminate;	Others include diseases of crops (e.g. Ralstonia
Result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality;	solanacearum, Tuta absoluta, Xanthomonas comprestris pv Manihot, Xanthomonas cospestris pv vignicola and Spodoptera frugiperda)
Require specific enhancements of laboratory diagnostic capacity and	Burkholderia mallei (Glanders)
enhanced disease surveillance	Burkholderia pseudomallei (Melioidosis)



	Chlamydia psittaci (Psittacosis)
	Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
	Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
	Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
	Rickettsia prowazekii (Typhus fever)
GM2 H	Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis])
	Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum)
CATEGORY C	Nipah virus
XI S	Hantavirus
These are third highest priority	Tick-borne hemorrhagic fever viruses
agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass	Tick-borne hemorrhagic encephalitis viruses
spread in the future because of:	Yellow fever
Availability;	Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Multi-drug resistant
Ease of production and dissemination;	tuberculosis)
Potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact	AND FAILE
UNIT	HIH

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Appendix II STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR MANDATE

Name of	List Enabling	Mandate, Functions, Biosecurity	Other useful
Organisation	Act, other	Activities and areas of expertise	information
0	legal	1	
	instruments,		
	and relevant	TO AN CO	
	Documents	17 million Land It	
National	National	Putting in place measures to ensure	
Biosafety	Biosafety	biosecurity.	~
Management	Management		13
Agency	Act 2015 (as	Lon Area all 6	B
Ø	amended)	1.11 20	S
Federal	Animal	Prevention, Control and Eradication of	i. The
Ministry of	Diseases	trans-boundary animal diseases and	Department of
Agriculture &	(Control) Act	pests; Control of vector and vector-	Veterinary and
Rural	CAP. A 17	borne diseases; Provision of veterinary	Pest Control
Development	L.F.N. 2004.	public health and food safety services;	Services
Link		Control of zoonotic diseases; Ensuring	certifies all
7.011	OIE Terrestrial	early detection of outbreaks for rapid	animals and
JI W	Animal Health	response; Certification of animals and	animal
0	Code.	products of animal origin for	products for
		international trade.	international
	NB: OIE is the	Dunny	trade.
	World	and the second se	ii. The
	Organization	and the first set of	Department is
	for Animal	Be mur and	in II.h. mtim
	Health	TANKA AND DA	collaboration
	C/REG.	TY AND FAITH	with the Federal
	21/11/10 on		Ministries of
	21/11/10 on the		Health and
	Harmonization		Environment
	of the		for the
	structural		implementation
	framework and		of the One-
	operational		Health
	rules pertaining		strategy.
	to health safety		Suucey.
	of plants,		
	or pranto,		



	• • •		
	animals and		
	food in the		
	ECOWAS		
	Region.		
National	National	Mandate	
Intelligence	Security	i. The general maintenance of the	
Agency (NIA)	Agencies Act	security of Nigeria outside Nigeria	
	(1986),	concerning matters that are not	
		related to military issues	
	NIA	ii. Such other responsibilities affecting	
	Instrument	national intelligence outside	
	No.1 (1999)	Nigeria as the National Defense	
	11011 (1999)	and Security Council or the	
		President Commander-in-Chief (C-	
	in the second se	in-C) of the Armed Forces, as the	
F	FIRS 1	case may be, may deem necessary.	FA
5		case may be, may deem necessary.	E
62	21	Functions (Instrument No. 1)	
X / 1	~	i. Monitoring the activities of any	1 Y
V/		person or organization outside	1 W
2			11P
V	$\gamma \sim <$	Nigeria whose conduct is aimed at	ales
		or capable of bringing disrepute to	
5	/ / 7	Nigeria or undermining the security	1 (7
4/21		or economy of the country.	4611
1-1-1-1 A	VA	ii. Monitoring the intentions and	$\chi / / \chi /$
21 (0)	6 67	policies of foreign countries	NU VS
		towards Nigeria	
		iii. Monitoring any external plans or	7
	1 and Martin	acts of subversion or sabotage	
	Mar and a second	against Nigeria or its economy	
	A Los anis	iv. Conducting espionage, covert	2
	6	operations and counter-intelligence	
		activities outside Nigeria	
	TIN	v. Collecting, collating and analyzing	
	U	eternal intelligence on political,	
		socio-economic and security	
		matters	
		vi. Establishing a database on foreign	
		nations, nationals and organizations	
		of intelligence or security interest	
		Biosecurity activities	
		Participated in trainings on	
		bioterrorism preparedness and	
		response.	



		1		[]
Office of the	Ratification of	i.	The NAC&BWC is the National	
Secretary to	the		Focal Point for the Biological	
the	Bacteriological		Weapons Convention –	
Government	(Biological)		Implementation Support Unit	
of the	and Toxin		(BWC-ISU) in relating with	
Federation	Weapons		relevant national stakeholders from	
(OSGF).	Convention		Government Ministries,	
	(BTWC) by		Departments and Agencies (MDAs)	
	Nigeria (9th		as well as the organised Private	
	July, 1973).		Sectors.	
	July, 1775).		Sectors.	
			Coordinating and anomaling	
	Establishment	ii.	Coordinating and overseeing	
	of the		national implementation of the	
		27	BTWC. The NAC&BWC organizes	
6	NAC&BWC	11	and chairs the Inter-Ministerial	2
6	by the Federal	11	Committee (IMC) on Chemical and	E
P	Government to	12m	Biological Weapons Conventions.	
8	implement the		The IMC meetings are held on	NY
NI.	objectives of		quarterly basis or as the need arises	
24	the BTWC in		with a view to ensuring effective	115
V	Nigeria. The		national implementation of the	(1)
	objective of the	100	Conventions in Nigeria. The IMC	1
	BTWC is to		comprises of over forty (40)	
- local	prohibit the		relevant Ministries, Departments	1 Carl
701	development,		and Agencies (MDAs) including the	1/0/1
JII (I)	production and		private sectors and national	ALLE
	stockpiling of		associations.	100
	bacteriological	-		
	(biological)	iii	Ensuring that Nigeria keeps abreast	
	and toxin		of all the developments in the BWC-	
	weapons and	3	ISU which is the global	
	on their	1	implementing body of the BTWC.	5
	destruction.		implementing body of the D1 WC.	
		T	Cuandata in a Ni Esta la Reconstitut an	1
	Development	1V.	Guaranteeing Nigeria's security or	
	of a national		any other related matter whatsoever	
	document titled		are not compromised in the process	
	National		of implementing the Convention.	
	Chemical and			
	Biological	v.	Organising national	
	Emergency		workshops/seminars to raise	
	Preparedness		awareness of relevant stakeholders	
	and Response		and the populace on biological	
	Plan		agents and toxins that can be	
	(NCBEPRP).		weaponized.	
	(INCOLFINE).	<u> </u>		



	701 1	
	The document	
	was developed	vi. Fostering the peaceful
	by the	use/application of Biology for
	NAC&BWC in	national development.
	collaboration	
	with relevant	
	national	
	stakeholders	
	and it outlined	
	policy actions	
	to be	
	undertaken by	
	the	A A A
	stakeholders in	
	preparing and	
F	responding to	AND AND AND
5	chemical and	
63	biological	WA NG
Y / 1	emergency	
VI	incidents. The	
2	Plan was	
V		
	approved by the Federal	
5	Executive	
4161	/	
1-1-1-1 A	Council (FEC)	
2101	on Wednesday,	
	25 th November,	
	2020.	
Federal	Federal	FCCPC's mandate among others
Competition	Competition	include:
and Consumer	and Consumer Protection Act,	Protect and promote the interests and
Protection	(FCCPA) 2018	welfare of consumers by providing consumers with a wider variety of
Commission	Sections: 1 (d),	quality products; Promote economic
(FCCPC)	17 (a) (b) (c)	efficiency; Contribute to the
(recre)	(d) (e) (f) (g) (i)	sustainable development of the
	(l) (c) (l) (g) (l) (l) (m) (s) (t)	Nigerian economy, among others;
	(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (i) (v) (v) (w) (x) (y)	Prohibit restrictive or unfair business
	(v) (v) (x) (y) (z) , 114, 116,	practices which prevent, restrict or
	123, 124, 125,	distort competition or constitute an
	126, 130, 131,	abuse of a dominant position of market
	133, 134, 135,	power in Nigeria; Organize and
	136, and 140.	undertake campaigns and other forms
	100, und 110.	of activities capable of promoting
		increased private and public consumer
L		mercused private and public consumer







	Γ		
National	The Powers	NABDA is the Designate Authority	National
Biotechnology	afforded to	for R&D in Biotechnology in Priority	Biotechnology
Development	NABDA	areas of food, agriculture, health,	Development
Agency	(National	industry and environment; Promotion,	Agency
	Biotechnology	Coordination and Deployment of	
	Policy, 2001);	Cutting-edge Biotechnology R&D	
	Biotechnology	Processes, Products and Services in	
	Bill, 2015;	Nigeria.	
	2021);		
	NC&BEPRP,	Biosecurity Activities include	
	2020.	Diagnosis and Characterization of	
	2020.	Biological Toxins and Agents;	
		Development of NABDA Biorisk	
		Laboratory Policy & Quality Manuals	
	in the second se	and Decontamination SOPs; Database	
F	All S	and Tracking System for Biological	RA .
6		Toxins and Agents.	E
62	21	TOXINS and Agents.	
¥ / 1	~	Biosecurity Expertise in NABDA is	1 Y
VI		essentially on Laboratory Biosecurity	
2		(Material Control & Accountability)	11P
National	Decree No 100	Strategic Communication	NOA is located in
Orientation	of 23rd	Strategie Communication	774 Local
			Government Area
Agency	August, 1993. Now an Act of		Government Area
(NOA)	Parliament		X / / / /
2101			NING:
\sim	(The National		(
	Assembly)		7
	Cap. No 64 of	mc Chumu I	
	2004		
Federal	Act 1 of 1980	i. Assisting in human capital	Focal point /Desk
Ministry of	0	development in Biosecurity	
Science,		issues.	bioterrorism in
Technology	TIN	ii. Collaboration/involvement in	the Ministry.
and	U	the production of guidelines on	
Innovation		biosecurity.	
		iii. Application of Science,	
		Technology and Innovation	
		apparatus to secure human lives	
		and biodiversity from bio-	
		threats	
		iv. Collaboration with local and	
		international Agencies/bodies	
		on biosecurity management.	



Г Г		i.	Collaborate with relevant	
Federal		1.	Agencies in the forensic	
			e	
Ministry of Environment			investigation and intelligence	
			analyses of Biological incidents	
(FMEnv)			involving contaminated water,	
			wastewater systems, air	
			emissions and underground	
			injections, human exposures	
			pursuant to existing global and	
		-	national regulations.	
		ii.	Safe disposal of biological waste	
			by providing advice as to suitable	
			short, medium and long-term	
		01111	disposal/storage options.	
Federal	12 1	i.	Provide assistance on the	2
Ministry of	4		preventive measures of toxic	B
Health (FMoH)	31	Le	biological materials.	S
81	Cr	ii.	Monitor the long-term Health	13
N/A		1	impacts of toxic biological	
211	1	\sim	materials involved.	AL
W		iii.	Assists in post-supportive care of	M
0.000			affected people	
Office of the		i.	Coordination of all national	
National		A	security matters	400 11
Security	VØ	ii.	Establishment of the Nigeria-	1111
Adviser	27		European Union CBRNE Risk	NING:
(ONSA)		·	Mitigation Centre initiative	\bigcirc
6		iii.	Carry out National Threat and	7
Df	1 and the		Risk Assessment on CBRNE	
Defence	and seemen a		aintain territorial integrity in case	
Headquarters	The mil		trans-boundary movement of	
(DHQ)			emical and Biological agents	
Department of State Service		i.	Gather, analyse and disseminate	
	TINI	II	intelligence as it relates to	
(DSS)	Con		Biological material threats;	
		ii.	Provide intelligence led support	
			in investigation, identification	
		iii.	and apprehension of perpetrators;	
		111.	Provide intelligence led support in collaboration with other	
			security elements in incident	
			management and response to	
			Biological material events;	
		iv.	Support periodic conduct of risk	
		1 .	and vulnerability assessment.	
			and vulneraointy assessment.	



Nigeria Police Force (NPF)	 i. Support and secure holding areas both off site and on site for supporting agencies and resources; ii. Support crowd and traffic
	control, as well as provide security support for casualty collection, treatment and transport loading areas.
Nigeria Centre	i. Maintain a good state of alertness
for Disease	to detect and respond to public
Control	health disaster due to pathogenic
(NCDC)	biological agents;
	ii. Prevent, detect and control
6 AR	diseases of national and
	international public health
A ~ 2	importance, including merging and re-emerging diseases;
$M \geq$	iii. Develop and maintain a network
XIN	of reference and specialized
- Unix	laboratories for pathogen,
20	biological detection disease
	surveillance and outbreak
Lee L	response.
7 n l l	iv. Provide support and coordinate
JU IDA L	the control of national and trans-
	border responses to mass public
	health emergencies such as mass causalities, flood, biological
1 march	terrorism as well as disease
	outbreaks
	multiple and the second second

UNITY AND FAITH



GOD BLESS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA